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Executive Summary  
The welfare system has been under attack for nearly a decade from austerity-driven cuts, mismanaged 
and under-funded schemes, and regulatory failures. Key areas are failing badly, with some 
programmes and services at risk of completely falling apart.  
This paper considers the challenges, focusing on work-related support from both sides of what is 
referred to as the work-welfare interface.  
Much of the impact of the system’s failures has been on labour market participants, particularly in the 
bottom 30% of the wage distribution. Most people in this group depend on a combination of wages 
and occupational benefits from their employer (the ‘work’ side of the interface) and income and other 
support from the State (the ‘welfare’ side). Shortcomings and system fai lures on both sides are leaving 
many people in poverty. After the 2018 Budget the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) described the 
‘rising tide’ of in-work poverty as ‘the problem of our times’. The Institute for Fiscal Studies reached 
the same conclusion, calling it the ‘big issue’ and identifying low earnings growth, poor productivity, 
and a rise in part-time work as causes. Although tax credits and income transfers from the State 
‘flatten’ and mitigate the impact of income inequalities between households, cuts to State support 
since 2015 have transformed that position for the worse.  
Low earnings and wage subsidisation owe much to the legacy of neo-liberal policies and the 
deregulation of the labour, housing, and social markets. Those challenges coupled with inadequate 
regulation of the employment and protection, highlighted by successive TUC reports  since Hard Work, 
Hidden Lives (2007a), weakened collective bargaining, and removal of sectoral wage-setting by the 
wages councils mean that there is little or no pressure on employers to pay above national minimum 
wage rates. Low productivity has been exacerbated by the lack of investment in training and skills 
development, and insufficient opportunities for career and wage progression, particularly in the low 
pay sectors. Employers benefit from massive levels of wage subsidisation but there is little reciprocity 
for that assistance.  
Against this background, there is a powerful case for reconstructing the wages floor with the aid of 
regulated collective bargaining, as proposed by the Institute of Employment Rights, while maintaining 
a national minimum wage aligned to the Real Living Wage as a safety-net. The IER’s Rolling Out the 
Manifesto for Labour Law sets out a detailed case for this. From a ‘welfare’ perspective this would also 
deliver a range of other attractive features, including better opportunities for wage progression and 
reduced reliance on benefits as wage top-ups (what has become, in effect, a State second wage). 
 
On the welfare side, the national roll-out of Universal Credit needs to stopped to enable fundamental 
flaws to be rectified. In particular, the value of in-work UC must be restored by lifting the freeze on 
annual up-ratings; and the original eligibility criteria for work allowances need to be reinstated (with 
full restoration of the allowances’ value). The operation of the earnings taper needs to be reviewed 
and reduced from its current high level. In the meantime, as advisers and union delegates pointed out 
at the Welfare Reform Summit 2018, there are serious concerns about the transition from tax credits 
and other legacy benefits to UC. Advisers are seeing a massive rise in debt, repossessions, and delays 
in accessing key support like childcare expenses.  
 




A key design feature of UC was to give a substantial State subsidy to low hours, low-paid, mini jobs. 
The aim was to raise the employment rate by following a similar policy to that deployed in Germany’s 
Harz IV labour market reforms (part of Gerhard Schröder’s Agenda 2010 changes). But there are big 
differences. German employers are more closely regulated in terms of the quality of such employment 
– for example through Germany’s labour inspectorate system (something which the UK lacks). 
Furthermore, they are subject to social insurance requirements, including national retirement pension 
insurance and health insurance payments, and wage taxes. Most UK mini jobs paid at minimum wage 
rates are increasingly likely to operate outside the National Insurance scheme. Together with the 
subsidy from UC, this creates a potent incentive for employers to create such work and to then keep 
wages below the Lower Earnings Limit for NI contributions (which is also the threshold at which 
benefits like SSP, SMP, SAP, etc become payable). This is an area of both Labour Law and Social Security 
Law policy that needs revisiting.  
 
In general, the scope for rebuilding the contributory part of the social security system needs to be 
explored, and measures taken to reverse the damaging effects of rises in the cost of National Insurance 
contributions, and cuts to the value of benefits. This has been described by Kate Bell and Declan 
Gaffney as the ‘nothing for something’ effect in the TUC’s Making a Contribution: Social Security for 
the Future. The long-term trend towards increasing reliance on means-tested in-work benefits should 
be reversed, particularly given the negative impact of poverty traps and the see -saw effect whereby, 
as wages rise, benefits are withdrawn. The problem of such traps also operates at a secondary level, 
for example when wages rise and support from sources like school meals and childcare vouchers is 
withdrawn (Children’s Society, 2017).  
Reform must also focus on childcare. Current deficiencies in the support provided to working parents 
who claim UC and receive the UC childcare costs element, and in the government's scheme for 
reimbursing childcare users with a portion of their costs, including a requirement that childcare costs 
must be paid up-front (and only later reimbursed), should be addressed. Inadequate support for 
private childcare providers also needs attention. Policy initiatives for a more comprehensive, universal 
childcare regime, need to be started.  
 
In the key area of support for housing costs the crisis has been intensify ing. The abolition of the 
scheme for helping with mortgage interest costs in 2018, and its replacement by a system of loans, is 
likely to be just the opening shot in a series of wider-ranging cutbacks affecting housing. As a result of 
low wage growth, rising living costs, and the way rent increases have outpaced wage rises, the number 
of workers having to claim Housing Benefit or UC housing costs element has risen dramatically. At the 
same time, a JRF analysis in 2018 of rents and wages across English districts shows that rental costs 
are now more than a third of full-time local pay in over half those districts (after the least expensive 
quarter of private rents was compared to earnings of the lowest paid quarter of employees). Using 
the same comparison, rent was more than half of local full-time pay in parts of London and the South-
East.  
Yet rather than trying to tackle the problem this key part of the housing crisis, the government’s 
response has largely been confined to making it harder for people to qualify for support, reducing the 




It will be necessary to start addressing the root causes of the housing crisis. These include the lack of 
affordable housing (for buying and renting), inadequate investment in social housing and support for 
local authorities’ programmes, and the absence of any kind of rent controls of the kind in operation in 
Ireland, Germany, and the USA.  
In the UK controls were abolished by the Housing Act 1980 as part of Conservative deregulation 
policies. The result has been a deepening housing crisis, and a massive fiscal burden for the community 
to have to bear. 
Clearly, there is a need to defend our welfare services, stop further disintegration, and reverse the 
threat to national and local services that collectively deliver an important social wage for millions of 
workers and their families. Going forward, renewal of the system is required to meet newer 
challenges, including the systemic rise in underemployment and likely impact of automation and 
artificial intelligence on employment – particularly in unskilled and semi-skilled work which is prone 
to displacement by artificial intelligence. These factors, and the increasing likelihood that there may, 
in time, simply be insufficient paid employment available, have been spurring debate as to whether a 














































































CHAPTER ONE  
 
Introduction & Overview  
 
Austerity, Cuts & ‘Welfare’  
 
Despite the Chancellor of the Exchequer declaring in the 2018 Budget that austerity is ‘coming to an 
end’ there is every sign that it is far from over. All the key social security benefits including in -work 
Universal Credit (UC) and Housing Benefit (HB) remain firmly frozen from April 2019 rather than being 
uprated. Other agencies like local authority social services continue to report cuts to their services.  
Despite such challenges, which have continued since 2010 when the Coalition government declared 
that the welfare system was ‘unsustainable’ with ‘costs spiralling out of control…’ (DWP, 2010a: ch. 2, 
paras. 3-5), and the very real threat of complete disintegration of programmes like Universal Credit 
(UC), the Welfare State
1 
struggles on. In doing so it still delivers support to millions of citizens, 
providing a sizeable social wage in return for a hefty investment by the community . This still accounts 
for over a third of government spending (ONS, 2016). Nevertheless, in spite of the scale of that 
investment – much of it the product of failing social policies - it would be foolish to imagine that the 
cumulative impact of cuts is not affecting the quality of support. In the period since 2010 the Local 
Government Association estimates that councils will have lost 60 pence in every pound of funding for 
services, and as a result of projected cuts it projects that there will be a funding gap of £8 billion by 
2025 (LGA, 2019a). 
 
Modern programmes still map on, broadly, to Beveridge’s Five Giants of Want, Disease, Ignorance, 
Idleness, and Squalor (Beveridge, 1942): but the intervening period has seen some sizeable extensions 
of support in areas like Community Care and local services
2
. But by far the biggest, and arguably most 
important, expansion has been in-work social security benefits. 
 
The current social security system is now pervaded by means-tested benefits with the primary 
function of supplementing low pay through earnings top-ups and other forms of support (housing and 
childcare costs, disability needs, and family-specific needs, as costs that would otherwise have to be 
paid for out of wages). Much of that support is delivered through benefits like Working Tax Credit, 
Universal Credit (UC), Housing Benefit, and local and national services for workers who have been 
injured at work
3
. The system is particularly important for 
workers in the bottom three deciles of the wage distribution where those in low pay are located. 
Depending on which definition of low pay is used this means between 5 and 6 million workers. When 
the growing number of ‘self-employed’ labour market participants are added to the figure it gets 
closer to 30 per cent of the distribution
4
. As the Institute of Employment Rights Rolling Out the 
Manifesto for Labour Law has rightly pointed out ‘Wages are so low that that most people receiving 
State benefits in the UK are actually in work’ (Ewing et al, 2018: 3). In practice, people may get support 
from social security benefits and other State welfare schemes such as the community care system - 
typically after an accident at work, or when groups like working claimants with a disability, parents 
with a child with special needs, or carers need to access support after a Care Act 2014 assessment, or 





Deregulation & Wage Subsidisation  
The scale of in-work assistance, which is currently growing exponentially as a result of the UC scheme’s 
support of the low hours, low-paid ‘mini jobs’ (which it was, in fact, designed to be able to support 
such work), highlights how State wage subsidisation has become an integral part of the remuneration 
system. The government’s success in encouraging such employment has been noted by the Social 
Security Advisory Committee. It also observed how the roll-out of UC has been accompanied by a 
‘dramatic rise in part-time and more flexible patterns of working’ (SSAC, 2017). That dependency is 
now a feature of low pay in most sectors, but it is particularly prevalent in the ten or so primary low-
pay sectors of the UK (IPPR, 2016) where the national minimum wage becoming a ‘going rate’ and 
‘ceiling’ (rather than the ‘minimum’ originally intended): this is in spite of fact that sectors like Retail 
and Accommodation and Food Services include employers which are among the largest, most 
profitable corporations in the world. Wider afield, State subsidisation of low-wage employment and 
self-employment through the in-work social security system in all sectors has been developing hand 
in hand with a fast-evolving gig economy (De Stefano, 2016; Broughton and Richards, 2016)) and in 
conjunction with a growth in precarious working conditions (TUC, 2017b).  
 
As this paper considers, the scale of low pay is putting an intense burden on welfare schemes and has 
been transferring much of the cost of the risks of low pay and poor working conditions away from 
employers and on to the community. A major cause of this, and in the widescale return to wage 
subsidisation since the 1980s, has been the legacy of neo-liberal, deregulation policies of the 1980s 
and 1990s (Martinez Lucio et al, 2017: 6): policies which weakened collective bargaining, wages 
councils, and other redistributive mechanisms in the labour market, producing a fall in earnings and 
the wages floor. The issue is explored later in this paper (in chapter 3), but the link between 
deregulation and a return to wage subsidisation through the social security system started to become 
clear when in-work benefits like Family Credit (FC) and Earnings Top-Up were being used to make up 
for wages falls in the aftermath of abolition of the wages councils - particularly in the low pay sectors 
where wages council orders had previously maintained a minimum wage floor and provided for grade 
structures and progression routes to higher wage rates and improved conditions (Puttick, 2018). 
Indeed, this developing role for the social security system was recognised by the Department of 
Employment well ahead of the wages councils’ final abolition  in 1993 (Department of Employment, 
1988). By 1999 schemes like Family Credit, its predecessor, Family Income Supplement, and Working 
Families Tax Credit were delivering a substantial supplement to earning (IFS, 1999) with awards in 
some cases representing as much as 40% of low-paid women’s earnings. In fiscal terms, the figures 
speak volumes in identifying trends. Real spending on tax credits and equivalents rose from £7bn per 
year in the mid-1990s, and then peaked at £32bn in 2011 in the period after the financial crisis and 
recession, and is currently £25bn (Joyce, 2018).  
 
Other factors have also been in play, including labour market transformations which have produced a 
proliferation of on-call and zero hours contracted employment, and other forms of ‘flexible work’ 
which may often not generate enough earnings to make it sustainable – at least without State top-
ups. The in-work tax credits system (now being replaced by UC) has not just provided employers with 
a system to relieve them of a sizeable portion of their labour costs,  and the need to pay a living wage: 
it has also created the conditions for the casualisation of employment conditions in general (Adams 




Casualisation and by-products like low pay, minimal occupational benefits, and poor progression 
opportunities have been long-standing issues that continue to impact disproportionately on women’s 
pay and conditions, and their ability to progress to better work (Costa Dias and Elming, 2016).  
 
Renewal at the Work-Welfare Interface 
 
This is explored later in the paper and brought together in the Welfare Futures chapter, but structural 
changes to redistributive mechanisms on both sides of the work-welfare interface are needed, 
including minimum wage, collective bargaining, and equalities legislation on the work side, and social 
security schemes like UC and support for housing and childcare costs on the welfare side. This will be 
essential in order to deal with what the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has called the ‘rising tide’ of in-
work poverty and ‘the problem of our times’. It observes that despite record employment rates, the 
number of people in poverty in working families has risen by over one million, with nearly 3 million of 
the children in poverty now in a working family: a situation which JRF says is ‘set to worsen further in 
future’. A re-design of UC is clearly necessary as a ‘first step’ so that it can boost the incomes of almost 
10 million parents and children in low pay households (JRF, 2018a)
5
. A similar analysis was also 
provided by the Institute for Fiscal Studies at the end of 2018. The IFS also identifies the ‘big issue’ as 
the growth in the number of people who are in poverty, pointing out that 57% of people in poverty 
are children or working-age adults living in a household where someone is in paid work (up from 35% 
in 1994-95) (Joyce, 2018). 
The IFS has gone much further, though, in identifying the causes of low pay and working poverty and 
commenting on changing demographics. ‘Dismal productivity performance’ and low earn ings growth 
are key factors. However, the more immediate driver has been a rise in earnings inequalities among 
men, something that has been caused in large part by the rise in men working part-time hours. A 
quarter of men on low hourly wages are now more l ikely to be working part-time, with a quarter of 
them working below 30 hours a week. Although the rise in cash transfers from tax credits, and UC has 
managed to keep the inequality in net incomes between working households ‘flat’, the position has 
been transformed since 2015 by the value of cash transfers being cut back as part of a ‘fiscal 
consolidation’. Translated, that means spending on tax credits and in-work support is falling is falling 
in real terms as a result of government cuts. According to the IFS, the ‘major policy lever’ that the 
government now favours as a means of ‘propping up low earners’ is the minimum wage. This has seen 
growth at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution that is higher than in previous years - but the 
problem remains that support from the in-work social security system has been reducing. 
 
However, there are still significant problems to be addressed, even with improvements in the level at 
which the NLW is pitched. As things stand, to start to secure a minimum income standard which could 
begin to obviate the need for State support, the NLW would need to be raised to at least the level of 
Living Wage Foundation's Real Living Wage. That would make a significant difference in comparison 
with the position for workers on the NLW. The current position is that even when two workers in the 
same family are working full-time, and earning at the level of the NLW, their combined earnings would 
still fall well short of a household income that their family group requires to get through the week, 
according to research in 2018 commissioned by the Child Poverty Action Group (Hirsch, 2018). This 
highlights the importance of the call in Rolling Out the Manifesto for Labour Law to introduce the Real 




In September 2018 the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John McDonnell MP, confirmed his 
support for a £10 an hour Real Living Wage at the Labour Party Conference (McDonnell, 2018) ; and 
he later repeated this in his response to the Budget in 2018. 
 
Advice Work Challenges  
 
The scale of current challenges provides little comfort for advisers who assist clients with complex 
advice needs including better off/worse off options and help with adjudication and appeals problems 
– particularly at a time of considerable uncertainty about the many structural weaknesses of UC as it 
continues to be rolled out. As at the start of 2019 sizeable numbers of claimants, including working 
claimants are still receiving ‘legacy’ benefits like Working Tax Credit, and are yet to migrate from 
legacy benefits like Working Tax Credit to UC. Indeed, the process is estimated to affect over 12 million 
households through until 2022. Unsurprisingly, food banks are busier than ever and stretched to 
capacity in the face of delayed payments (Trussell Trust, 2018). Worse, the government’s promised 
‘Universal Support’ – a system of measures which is supposed to be helping the transition process – 
has not been much in evidence, leaving hard-pressed advisers, unions helping their members, and 
voluntary organisations to cope (Jitendra, 2018: 6). The advice role has never been tougher as 
delegates from advice organisations, charities, and unions concluded at the Welfare Reform Summit 
2018 at Staffordshire University which was funded by the Social Policy Association and organised in 
collaboration with the Child Poverty Action Group (Machin et al, 2018: 10-13). 
 
Future Prospects  
Going forward, the prospects are anything but good. They look set to remain unchanged into the tax 
and benefits year 2019-20 and beyond unless effective mechanisms are introduced to raise the wage 
floor and structurally improve Universal Credit. The projected negative impacts from tax and benefits 
changes through to 2021-22 (when the current Parliament is due to end, assuming it runs its full 
course). This was charted comprehensively in a 2018 report for the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (Portes and Reed, 2018). It laid out a catalogue of horrors in terms of the expected effects 
of current policies. Pointing out that changes to taxes, benefits, tax credits and Universal Credit (UC) 
since 2010 have been largely regressive - however measured - with the largest impacts being felt by 
those on the lowest earnings and incomes, it concludes that those in the bottom two deciles of the 
wage and income distribution are projected to lose, on average, approximately 10% of their net 
income. Further up the distribution, groups like the ‘just about managing’ (JAMS), who must rely 
increasingly on benefits and support from sources like Housing Benefit and UC housing costs, are not 
spared. Much of the ‘gain’ from NLW rises is off-set by benefits cuts (Finch, 2018).  
 
Despite the promise of some additional funding to ‘ease the transition from legacy benefits and tax 
credits to UC’ announced in the Autumn Budget in October 2018 (Budget 2018), no substantive 
changes are expected to be made to the UC scheme itself until the national roll-out is completed. That 
could still be five years away. A major concern is the reduction since 2015 in the value of UC work 
allowances, the continuing refusal to extend allowances to second earners in a household, and the 
low value of support from UC. Although there is to be a partial reversal of the cuts to work allowances 
for several groups from April 2019 (discussed further in 'April 2019 Rises' in the section Assessing the 




since 2015 (Turner, 2018). Whilst promises to make funding available to ease the transition from 
legacy benefits to UC are welcome, there is no sign yet of any significant changes to the structure  of 
the scheme. 
 
In political terms there is not much doubt that the crises linked to UC could prove to be what a previous 
Conservative Prime Minister, John Major, has called the government’s ‘poll tax moment’. That view 
was supported by the Director of the IFS when commenting on the complex challenges the DWP faces 
in managing the millions of transfers to UC during the transition process (Johnson/IFS, 2018). Another 
former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown – the architect of the tax credits regime which UC is replacing 
– has called for a halt to the UC ‘experiment’. He described it as ‘cruel and vindictive beyond austerity’ 
(Brown, 2018). He added that the safety-net was no longer the Welfare State but had become food 
banks and charities.  
As this paper argues, there is a clear need to defend our welfare services, stop further disintegration, 
and reverse the threat to national and local services. The social security system is not the only part of 
the Welfare State in crisis. Local services, too, are under siege as programmes and services are run 
down, and funding is projected to be massively cut (LGA, 2017). Besides saving existing programmes 
and schemes, it will be necessary to commit to renewal in the form of a new generation of policies 
with adequate funding for much-needed programmes like universal childcare, and local care services. 
These are the kinds of areas which the General Secretary of the TUC, Frances O’Grady, has said should 
become ‘a new pillar of the Welfare State’ (O’Grady, 2012). However, they are only two of a much 
wider range of core areas for reform where a combination of new legislative interventions, regulatory 
measures, and properly-funded programmes are needed. 
For reasons which are explored in this paper, there is every reason to doubt government claims that 
current policies are making work pay, lifting people out of benefits dependency, or transforming the 
UK from being ‘a low wage, high tax, high welfare economy’ into a ‘higher wage, lower tax, lower 
welfare’ one (as a former Chancellor, George Osborne MP said could be expected in his 2015 Budget 
speech (Budget 2015). 
 
Clearly, the goal of achieving higher wages and improved working conditions, coupled with a reduced 
dependency on the State welfare system, should also be a project for a progressive incoming 
government committed to a programme of renewal of Welfare State institutions and programmes. 
But this is only likely to be achieved through the adoption of an altogether different set of policy 
objectives, including measures to stimulate productivity and growth, secure investment in training 
and progression opportunities 6, and reconstruct collective bargaining. It will also be necessary to 
adopt a new generation of schemes and regulatory powers to rebuild the social protection floor.  
 
  
In the rest of this paper the scheme is as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 examines more closely the specific ways in which the State welfare system delivers support, 
including regulatory interventions, benefits, and services.  
Chapter 3 tracks the transition from a predominantly insurance-based welfare system to one that is 
dominated by means-tested benefits one which subsidises a sizeable and growing section of the 




Chapter 4 looks at the growth of ‘make work pay’ schemes and specific modes of delivering support, 
including tax-based schemes.  
 
Chapter 5 considers the effectiveness of the current minimum wage, equalities, and other 
interventions for maintaining the wages and conditions floor.   
 
Chapter 6 provides a commentary on the Universal Credit scheme and other forms of in-work support.  
 













































CHAPTER 2  
 




State support for people’s welfare has a long history reaching back to well before Beveridge and the 
post-World War II Welfare State. Early social insurance in pre-State systems took a variety of forms 
including the pooling of community assets and risks, and redistribution on solidarity and insurance 
principles as an extension of different levels of reciprocity and types of ‘exchange’ (Lee, 1998; Sahlins, 
2004: 191-204). Newer forms of insecurity, risk, and ‘welfare’ came with the transition to a market 
economy and development of the State, particularly for those engaged in wage labour and dependent 
on a job and wages for subsistence (Polanyi (1944), 2001). In Britain the Poor Law marked the start of 
State welfare system, at least as a national scheme operating within a framework of national 
legislation, even if it was largely funded and managed at a parish level. For present purposes, a key 
function under the ‘old’ poor Law was the support it gave working claimants, inc luding early forms of 
wage subsidisation. In particular, it could extend support to low-paid workers as ‘outdoor relief’, 
‘allowances in aid of wages’, and in other forms (Hollen Lees, 1997: 60-64; Mitchison, 2000) – typically 
as support for seasonal workers in out-of-season periods, or when wages reduced or stopped 
altogether. Under the Speenhamland system the parish - having supplied workers to employers - could 
make up the difference between what the employer paid and what was deemed to be an appropriate  
level of minimum subsistence income (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: 126-130). In many ways this 
mirrors the approach taken in the calculation of modern means-tested benefits like Income Support, 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (income-based), Working Tax Credit, and Universal Credit (for example when 
the claimant’s needs in the form of her ‘maximum amount’ is compared to her income, and then 
support makes up any deficit month by month): a system discussed in chapter 6.  
 
This form of Poor Law support was curtailed, however, after 1834.
1 
Nevertheless, the labour market 
by this time had started to depend on an ‘efficient and ubiquitous welfare system’ (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 2005: 20-22). Since then, the social security system has continued to grow and develop in 
different directions, with newer schemes based on a mix of insurance, universalism, and solidarity 
principles. However, the specific function of wage subsidisation using publicly-funded resources did 
not make a comeback until the 1970s. When it did, with benefits l ike Family Income Supplement, and 
Family Credit and Earnings Top-Up, it was mostly due to the limitations in coverage by the national 
insurance system, and the impact of labour market transformations - particularly the expansion of 
low-paid, part-time work, weakened collective bargaining and unions, and the abolition of other 
redistributive mechanisms like the wages councils. With the introduction of Universal Credit, the State 
now delivers a sizeable wage subsidy and package of childcare, housing, and othe r support to those 
working in low hours, low-paid 'mini jobs'.    
 
Before looking more closely at key components of the current legal regime dealing with low pay – 
minimum wage-setting, collective bargaining, and in-work UC – it is necessary to look more holistically 






Delivering ‘Welfare’  
 
Broadly, in-work welfare currently depends on these sources:  
 
(1) The courts and tribunals  
(2) Legislative interventions and regulation  
(3) The regulated social market  
(4) Social security schemes  
 
All are important, but each presents its own challenges.  
 
(1) The Courts & Tribunals  
 
Traditionally, the contract of employment, as developed by the courts, provided (and still provides) a 
degree of regulation and allocation of legal responsibilities. In ‘welfare’ terms the allocation of 
responsibilities to employers has been important, and no more so than the Common Law ‘duty to pay 
wages’ and to maintain wages during temporary earnings interruptions. The employment contract 
also provided the means of channelling a wider range of risks and support through collective 
bargaining as well as a conduit for support for workers through social insurance schemes and public 
welfare services (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: 15, 16).  
 
The limitations of the employment contract can be seen, however, in court decisions on the scope of 
implied contractual responsibilities like the duty to pay wages. These can be curtailed or dispensed 
with altogether – typically after an employer reserves a power to unilaterally modify terms and 
conditions. This is something which has produced some startling results in favour of employers, for 
example in leading cases like Bateman where Asda Stores was able to rely on a clause in the staff 
handbook enabling changes to terms and conditions to be made unilaterally.
2 
The ability of employers 
to deploy their bargaining power to force a re-structuring of wages systems - for example by the 
introduction of collectively agreed annualised hours agreements which displace rights to overtime pay 
or shift premia or make eligibility more restrictive - also highlights the problem.
3 
In areas like 
contractual sick pay – an important source of assistance, particularly for groups like the low-paid or 
self-employed who may be ineligible for State incapacity benefits like Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) or 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) - the courts and tribunals can be reluctant to fall back on 
mechanisms like implied duties to require normal wages or sick pay to be paid. The absence of a 
Labour Inspectorate to which workers can turn for help, and the problem of lack of specialist legal 
advice and representation (Legal Aid is unavailable in employment and social security cases), is 
compounded by the difficulties of getting employers to comply with tribunal orders - something the 
TUC has warned about for some while (TUC, 2007). This could get worse if, as expected, the 
government reintroduces tribunal fees in 2019. 
 
The courts also play a decisive role in the Public Law sphere when it comes to determining the scope 
of the State’s liability to deliver or maintain welfare support. This generally entails hearing appeals in 
jurisdictions like support for working parents with children with special needs, or disabled workers 




of local authorities who in a time of austerity have to plead a ‘lack of resources’ as a defence to claims. 
Perversely, that means that even when the claimant’s needs are visibly going up, the courts have been 
ready to accept that as a result of government cutbacks, and a local authority's reduced resources, a 
person’s support from the State may go down. Furthermore, human rights have not been allowed to 




(2) Legislative Interventions and Regulation  
 
Legislation like minimum wage-setting and equalities law operates by modifying the contractual 
obligations of employers in order to secure welfare services (Kronman, 1980: 5). For present purposes, 
the most important interventions, as these help to raise the wages floor, are the National Minimum 
Wage Act 1998 and regulations, the Working Time Regulations 1998, and equal pay requirements in 
the Equality Act 2010. For workers who are single parents the ability to secure child maintenance as a 
result of interventions like the Child Support Act 1991 and the Child Maintenance and Other Payments 
Act 2008 which reformed the child support formula are important in providing a potentially valuable 
income stream in addition to their wages and social security income (Puttick, 2003). In order to 
maximise the financial take from such sources, particularly in the face of an in-work support system 
that is pervaded by means-testing, the system has to deliver effective income ‘disregards’ or other 
forms of ring-fencing to maintain the value of such sources. This is something that the new Universal 
Credit regime has signally failed to do, for example by removing the income disregard for spousal 
maintenance. 
 
The ability of these and other regulatory interventions to raise the wage floor is important. However, 
in practical terms, for workers on means-tested benefits like Working Tax Credit or Universal Credit, 
the value of any gains from schemes like the NMW or Equality Act 2010 is immediately off-set as a 
result of the way means-testing works. Subject to any ‘disregards’ being available, or assistance from 
the UC work allowance – a mechanism which has been massively limited since 2015 – the see-saw 
effect whereby as wages go up, welfare support goes down, operates as a significant limitation on the 
value of such interventions.  
 
In a number of other key areas which impact on workers’ welfare, such as housing costs, the current 
regime is unable to intervene to regulate rents (as it did until the Housing Act 1980 ‘deregulated’ the 
rented property sector and rent controls). Workers currently pay a sizeable proportion of their wages 




Collective bargaining at all levels – national, sectoral, enterprise - is a form of regulation in itself, 
providing a legal framework for the work bargain, and at the same time delivering collectively agreed 
wages and occupational benefits - secured through the medium of the individual contract of 
employment. Many of those benefits obviate (or reduce) the need for workers to access State social 
security benefits – especially as they may overlap in dealing with the same contingencies: sickness, 
pension, and other entitlements. One of the negative features of moving towards a gig economy in 
which workers are outside the scope of such bargaining, and protection, is that the State w elfare 





A major problem that has resulted from the decline in bargaining coverage is that there are  now some 
significant areas of the labour market, including low pay sectors with little or no union presence or 
representative bodies from either side – employees or employers - where there is minimal provision 
of work-related benefits. That problem has also extended into newer, and fast-growing areas like the 
gig economy and self-employment. There are an estimated 7.7 million people who are self-employed 
or in the gig economy and paid for short-term or task work through digital platforms. Inevitably, this 
means added pressure on State social security systems, contributing to what this paper considers 
later, which is a crisis of coverage and a fiscal crisis. 
Furthermore, there is a danger that the longer this challenge is left unattended this is a space that will 
be filled by private provision, much of it inadequately unregulated. From the private pro viders’ 




Collective bargaining institutions are themselves the product of regulation by the State (Ewing and 
Hendy, 2017). As this paper argues later, the State’s ability to regulate facilitates newer approaches 
to the challenge of how to construct systems of bargaining that can make a better, more meaningful 
impact on the wages and conditions floor. Indeed, many of the recommendations set out in the IER’s 
Rolling Out the Manifesto for Labour Law (Ewing et al, 2018) will depend on effective new regulatory 
measures like the Manifesto’s proposed Collective Bargaining Act (ibid, pp.18-27). 
 
(3) The Regulated ‘Social Market’  
 
In theory, State involvement in social welfare is unnecessary in a society in which the market could 
cater for citizens’ welfare needs by developing and providing financial services products, and through 
savings, investment, and borrowing. If functioning effectively this would, in theory, obviate the need 
for State provision (Barr, 2001: 11, 12). In general, the marketeers would claim that the market can 
deliver most things, except for some groups like the ‘lifetime poor’ who are unable to save or borrow, 
and who might therefore struggle to get assistance from anywhere other than the family, community, 
or State-managed sources (Barr, 2001: 11,12). Legal philosphers like Joseph Nozick do not just criticise 
the Welfare State but most kinds of welfare-led intervention or 'forced distribution' unless delivered 
as an 'exchange' (Nozick, 1974). 
 
The reality, however, is vastly at odds with the theory. It is not necessary to look much further than 
market failures in action, whether it is private pension scheme failures, the Maxwell, BHS, and Carillion 
scandals, and the on-going failures of the Pension Regulator. Wider afield, the failure of privatised 
services in areas like probation (which in 2018 were the subject of highly negative criticisms in the 
annual reports of HM Inspectorate of Probation). Other problem areas with a direct impact on workers 
have included the scheme for assisting users of private childcare services, organised around the 
government’s commitment to refund 20 per cent of their costs. Despite its importance, the system 








Governments since the 1990s have experimented with the idea of a ‘better regulated’ social market. 
New Labour developed its Third Way approach to a semi-privatised model of the Welfare State, 
declaring in the New Welfare Contract (New Ambitions, 1998: 80) that ‘one of the duties of 
government’ was to ‘regulate effectively so that people can be confident  that private pensions and 
insurance products are secure’ (New Ambitions, 1998: 80). Legislation like the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 followed, deploying a complex mix of self-regulation and light touch interventions. 
In terms of securing safe investments and insurance products it would be fair to say that any evidence 
of success has been decidedly mixed, particularly in the light of company pensions management 
failures and product mis-selling scandals. The current government undertook in its 2017 election 
manifesto to maintain effective regulation while at the same time promising organisations that it was 
committed to reducing the costs of regulation, through controversial schemes like the Red Tape 
Challenge and One-In-Two-Out initiatives (Conservative Manifesto, 2017:15). Based on the evidence 
of the failure of regulation in this key area of welfare, the Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz was warning 
about the risks of allowing State pensions in the USA to be privatised. He cited the failures of the  UK 
pensions market as an excellent reason for not doing so (Stiglitz, 2010: 89). 
 
A decade after New Ambitions and the legislation in 2000, a new threat came from another quarter. 
At the same time as local authority community care and social services schemes were being hit by 
budget cuts – the start of austerity - the Prime Minister, David Cameron MP, announced a new 
initiative, the Big Society project. On the face of it this seemed to be a clear call for the voluntary sector 
to take on roles which had traditionally been seen as functions of the State and the welfare system, 
aided by some State pump-priming. This was widely seen signalling a major downsizing of the Welfare 
State. On the face of it, such a pro-active use of State resources to kick-start community-based social 
capital, volunteering, etc, seemed to be at odds with a neo-liberal political agenda that was largely 
hostile to the whole idea of State-managed and publicly resourced ‘welfare’ (Ferragina and Arrigoni, 
2018). 
Perhaps a much more significant concern has been with the creeping privatisation of healthcare and 
local services – particularly since the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 did much to develop the 
internal markets in both health and social care. It was certainly a major step in making the system a 
services ‘enabler’ rather than just a direct provider. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 and Care Act 
2014 then took the scope for further privatisation of the health and care sectors considerably further. 
That risk increased considerably with the 2012 Act’s schemes, as the NHS Consultants Association co-
chairman, Clive Peedell, warned would happen in the British Medical Journal (Peedell, 2011: 342).  
 
Elsewhere, the failures of the Office of the Rail Regulator to improve the quality of service, and 
constrain fare rises – something that has an immediate impact on the workers’ ability to get to and 
from work, and not be subject to exploitative fares – is perhaps the best testament to the perils of 
allowing a utility as important as the rail network to be in the private sector, and under the auspices 
of such a poor system of regulation. The idea of the State as a regulator rather than as a provider has 
been a controversial feature of welfare discourse for as long as the Welfare State came into existence 
in its modern form. Indeed, commentators like the social historian Asa Briggs, in The Welfare State in 
Historical Perspective, described the ability of the State to use its power, including the law, to ‘modify 
the play of market forces’, provide people with sufficient income, and enable them to mee t key ‘social 




like the rail franchises should be allowed to continue when regulation of the quality of services and 
fares has been failing for so long.  
 
(4) Social Security Schemes  
 
State welfare schemes, as managed by governmental agencies, feature strongly in the redistributive 
process, and are at the heart of the modern welfare system. The schemes are not just complex, they 
are expensive to fund. In the financial year ending 2017 £264 billion was spent on welfare, which was 
34% of all government spending (ONS, 2016). If the spending on all Welfare State schemes and services 
is added to social security costs, for example social services and social housing, the figure rises to an 
estimated £484 billion (about 25 per cent of GDP) (OBR, 2018a).  
 
The system relies on different forms of support with claimants, typically, drawing on one or more of 
the three main types of benefits: contributory, non-contributory/universal, and means-tested. Each 
scheme within the typology is funded differently, and operates in distinctive ways, with its own 
frequently complex eligibility criteria, claims and payment processes
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. To that extent, the move to 
consolidate six of the most complex schemes into Universal Credit was a praiseworthy initiative, even 
if the process has been mismanaged and is unravelling badly.  
 
As far as contributory benefits are concerned, the main benefits catered for by the Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (SSCBA1992) Part II and regulations include the biggest area of 
welfare ‘spend’, State Retirement Pension (OBR, 2018a). Although benefits like Jobseeker’s Allowance 
and Employment and Support Allowance can be claimed on a contributions basis, they are hybrid 
contributory/means-tested benefits – and in practice the means-tested part of the system is now the 
pervasive part of the system. For claimants who may be ineligible for contributory benefits as a result 
of a lack of sufficient NI contributions or credits, there is generally scope to receive support from a 
means-tested benefit, subject to eligibility and 'means'; or to access support in other ways on a non-
contributory basis. The point is an important one for workers and their dependants in various 
situations. For example. incapacity benefits like ESA can be claimed by younger workers who have 
accidents or incapacitating illness before they are able to build up a sufficient contributions record 
(SSCBA s.30A), and bereavement benefits can be claimed on a non-contributory basis by the surviving 
spouse of a worker who dies in an industrial accident or from a prescribed industrial disease.    
 
The decline of the contributory principle is considered further in the next chapter.  
 
The second group in the typology, non-contributory/universal, are described in the SSCBA and 
detailed in Part III of the Act and regulations for each benefit. They include important sources of State 
support like Statutory Sick Pay, Statutory Maternity Pay, Personal Independence Payment, Carer’s 
Allowance, and Industrial Injuries Scheme Benefits. The fact that they are not contributory is helpful 
to groups working in the kind of employment in which it is difficult to build up adequate National 
Insurance contributions to qualify for contribution-based support, as is the absence of a means-test 




eligibility criteria and in some cases tough medical, other requirements, and on-going review 
processes. Claimants may be subject to a range of administrative procedures for monitoring ongoing 
entitlement, including medical examinations, postal checks and questionnaires, and in some cases 
home visits. There are also potent employment status criteria, so that non-employees are barred from 
schemes like SSP and SMP. If there is doubt as to eligibility, decision makers are likely to suspend 
support first and carry out checks later while further information is requested and checked to establish 
if claimants are still entitled to support. In an adjudication system that is currently massively under-
resourced and under pressure – particularly as UC is rolled out – delays can be lengthy.  
 
The benefits in the means-tested/income-related benefit group, in practice now the most important 
of the three groups in the typology, are also catered for in the SSCBA, legislation like the Jobseekers 
Act 1995, or the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (as it deals with UC), and scheme-specific regulations. 
Benefits which are particularly relevant in the in-work support context include Income Support and 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Income-Based) as they are still being paid to workers working below the 16-
hours a week threshold (24 hours a week if they are part of a couple) pending their migration to 
Universal Credit. Tax credits (notably Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit) are also still being paid 
as ‘legacy benefits’. 
Various negative features are associated with the way means-tested in-work benefits operate. One of 
these is a 'see-saw' effect whereby, as wages rise, means-tested benefits income generally falls (and 
a fall in wages will generally mean a rise in benefit income). Subject to the operation of any available 
disregards, or work allowances in the case of UC, this can leave workers in a constant trap. It can also 
wipe out much, if not all, of any gains from pay rises, or equal pay awards. For workers on variable 
hours and, therefore, earnings, the experience of being on in-work benefits can be more like a roller 
coaster ride. The problem has been aggravated since 2015 by the exclusion of groups like single 
workers from the work allowances system, and reductions in the value of allowances for others. For 
low-paid workers who are dependent on State benefits there is little or no chance of escape unless 
they can enter employment that is paid at a level which takes them out of the trap.  Other parts of a 
worker’s overall package of State support can also be affected by earnings traps. For example Housing 
Benefit as it is still being paid to claimants on tax credits will rise and fall in a similar fashion; and with 
the government’s introduction of mean-testing of school meals and childcare vouchers in 2018 
workers in low-paid jobs who qualify can lose it as soon as their earnings rise above the prescribed 
thresholds above which that support is withdrawn (Children’s Society, 2018).  
Broadly, means-testing means that eligibility, and the amount of benefit paid, is determined by 
identifying the claimant’s needs (and those of his/her dependants’, if any)  – as determined by 
reference to prescribed allowances, premia, housing costs, etc – and then comparing these with 
‘income’ and other assessable resources, or what the law treats as an available resource. If the 
claimant's needs exceed their resources, the difference will be the subject of State support through 
schemes like tax credits or UC. Controversially a benefits ‘cap’ operates to reduce the overall amount 




A further feature of the system has been the intensification of requirements that claimants should 




minimised. This aspect of the system can impact in many negative ways on vulnerable groups. As the 
Child Poverty Action Group has been arguing in test cases, the expectation that groups like single 
parents with young children, should have to increase their work-load to 16 hours a week in order to 
meet the demands of their Claimant Commitment, and thereby avoid the imposition of the benefits 
cap and at the same time meet their parenting responsibilities, is both irrational and an infringement 
of their rights as parents and workers.
  
This was the view, too, of a High Court judge in 2017 in a case 
in which a lone parent with two young children objected to having her benefits cut back . This was as 
a result of not securing employment at or above the 16-hours threshold at which the cap on support 
is lifted. The decision of the Supreme Court will either vindicate the government’s whole approach to 
progression or drive a coach and horses through the entire policy position
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. 
Together with people with a disability and older labour market returnees, lone parents are often 
among the groups which can accurately be described as in working poverty. These are among the 
groups the UN Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty and Human Rights had in his sights in his report 
on poverty in the UK when he observed that ‘being in employment does not magically overcome 
poverty’. The report painted an unremittingly bleak picture of poverty in the UK, including working 
poverty (Alston, 2018; IER News Brief 16/11/18).  
 
Unfortunately, as considered in chapter 4, prospects for those on UC, or due to be migrated to UC, 
and who are in low hours, low-paid mini jobs are not going to get any better any time soon.  
 
Complexity, Adjudication & Advice 
A key problem with the current social security system is its complexity, coupled with the overriding 
point that many benefits are no longer being paid at a level which is needed. A person may be eligible 
for one or more of the first two groups outlined above – contributory and non-contributory/universal 
– but still have insufficient support from these to be able to get through the week without the 
additional support from means-tested schemes. The contributory part of the system has been in 
decline for some while. As a result, reliance on means-tested support has grown exponentially. The 
point is readily illustrated by the State Retirement Pension. Largely as a result of labour market 
transformations, increasing numbers of RP claimants may have little or no support from a private 
pension and only qualify for a much-reduced level of State pension as a result of gaps in their NI 
records: something which then requires top ups from Pension Credit.
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This can also affect other groups like long-term incapacitated and disabled people, or their carers who 
receive benefits like ESA, PIP, or Carers Allowance, paid at levels which often still need further ‘topping 
up’ from means-tested benefits. In practice, most claims by employed claimants must now be 
organised around a ‘lead’ means-tested benefit like Income Support, JSA (income based), Working Tax 
Credit, or UC. Establishing eligibility, navigating through the barriers that vulnerable members of the 
claimant community can experience, and suffering while protracted processes like ‘mandatory 
reconsideration’ and appeal are played out, have been accurately portrayed in films like I Daniel Blake 







Rising Costs  
 
These trends have played a major part in the rising costs of the social security system. It is certainly 
the case that spending has increased fourfold in cash terms over the past 30 years, and has more than 
doubled in real terms, after adjusting for inflation (OBR, 2018b). This has been exacerbated by 
changing demographics. For example, spending on State Retirement Pension has been ‘pushed higher’ 
according to the OBR by the proportion of adults over State Pension Age. With a rising share of the 
population renting rather than owning their home, there is also a rise in the take -up of Housing 
Benefit. That problem has been amplified by a sizeable shift in the claimant population from social 
housing to the private-rented sector where rents are higher, and subsidy for rents is also therefore 
higher. With stagnating wages in the bottom three deciles of the wage distribution, more HB claims 
(as well as claims for in-work benefits generally) have been partly responsible for the system’s rising 
costs. As the OBR has also pointed out, changes in inflation typically drive the uprating of most welfare 
payments. If inflation is higher than earnings growth, the social security bill will generally rise relative 
to national income – something which can be offset by government decisions on matters like up-
rating: and that has certainly been seen with recent government cutbacks and freezes to benefits up-
ratings.  
 
Benefits are now being paid at an extremely low level. As organisations like the Child Poverty Action 
Group have been saying for more than a decade this leaves many families struggling well below the 
official poverty line, and certainly below an acceptable  minimum standard that is sufficient to 
constitute an effective safety net (CPAG, 2009: 6). This is also borne out by reports like ‘Jobless in 
Wolverhampton’ recounting the lived experience of groups like unemployed claimants trying to get 
by on benefits like JSA, and the difficulties they have in getting through the week on a level of income 
that bears little or no resemblance to what is needed (BBC/Will Self, 2018).  
 
In the next chapter consideration is given to how Social Security has transitioned from a system of 
collective social insurance, organised predominantly around the contribution principle and 
contributory benefits, to one now dominated by means-testing, and with wage subsidisation at its 
heart.  














































CHAPTER 3  
From Collective Insurance to Means-Testing & Wage Subsidisation  
Introduction  
Arguably, one of the most problematic challenges facing the Social Security system has been the move 
away from contribution-based benefits as the dominant form of social security in the typology 
considered in the last chapter, and to a pervasive system of means-tested regime funded out of 
taxation and borrowing. The centre-piece of the new order is Universal Credit. Once UC has been fully 
rolled out, it will represent a massive expansion of dependency on the State by workers in millions of 
low hours, low-paid mini jobs, many of them displaying the characteristics of short-term, precarious, 
and poor-quality work (as considered in chapter 6). Clearly, the UC scheme is tailor-made to fuel the 
government’s ambitions for maintaining its much-vaunted ‘record low unemployment’ – but it is 
coming at a considerable fiscal cost to the community. If the analysis of the Office of Budget 
Responsibility is correct, it may, in fact, offer little by way of fiscal savings (OBR, 2018b). What it will 
risk, however, is an increasingly dysfunctional labour market accompanied by some sizeable 
transformations in the nature of work. As the Social Security Advisory Committee has noted, UC’s roll-
out is coinciding with a ‘dramatic growth in the part-time and more flexible patterns of working’ (SSAC, 
2017). In fact, the UC system is now facilitating this by adding to existing tax, National Insurance, and 
other systemic incentives for employers to create such employment.  
One of the main characteristics of this development is that many of the workers in part-time, often 
short-term work, are unlikely to be able to accrue a National Insurance contributi ons record that will 
give them the security of having access to contributory benefits like a full State Retirement Pension. 
For that reason, it is worth considering the scope for a how a reformed contributions-based system 
might alter that position, particularly through ways which might bring groups like low hours, low-paid 
part-timers into the contributory benefits sphere.  
Before exploring this further, consideration is given to the way the contributory principle and 
contribution-based benefits have evolved and have been affected by later developments and labour 
market transformations. 
 
The Contributory System  
Insurance principles occupied an important place in 19
th 
century provision, particularly through mutual 
associations and friendly societies, including trade union insurance schemes. This was well ahead of 
the non-contributory pension introduced in 1908 – often seen as the start of the modern State welfare 
system. A concern not to lose popular support for necessary health and unemployment measures 
prompted the Liberal government to design much of the provision in the National Insurance Act 1911 
on a contributory basis. The scheme was based on contributions from employers, workers, and the 
taxpayer rather than simply being funded out of taxation. This tripartite model catered for partial 
income replacement for wage earners during time-limited periods of sickness absence from work. The 
attraction of such collective insurance, organised and managed by the State for the first time through 
contributions forwarded to a National Insurance Fund, was that for a modest payment of 4 pence a 
week the scheme gave people something entirely new: a degree of income security for anything up to 




pence dawn of hope’. Even more novel was that for a small weekly contribution - supplemented by 
payments from the employer and taxpayer - workers could get unemployment insurance in the form 
of a payment for up to 15 weeks a year. 
A combination of contributory and non-contributory support after World War 1 was available for the 
unemployed and other claimant groups - but this became increasingly restrictive under successive 
Unemployed Insurance Acts through until 1930, and after the depression took hold and demands on 
the system grew. An era of austerity ushered in by cuts to benefits (including the infamous cut to 
unemployment benefit imposed by the National Government led by Ramsay Macdonald under the 
National Economy Act 1931) was followed by an intensification of means-testing through measures 
like family means-testing. The notorious National Government Means Test marked the start of the 
kinds of stigma which are still associated with claiming means-tested support.
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At the height of the 
depression, when there were insufficient jobs for the unemployed, claimants could be expected to 
attend training camps as a condition of take-up: an early taster for the kinds of mandatory activities 
now catered under measures like the ‘work-related requirements’ for JSA, the accompanying 
‘claimant commitment’, and sanctioning for non-compliance.
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By the end of the 1930s and the start of World War II State provision consisted of a mix of social 
insurance covering the major causes of income loss, but only provided benefits at a flat rate ‘survival’ 
level. This was combined with some residual means-tested support. That approach remained largely 
unaltered by the programme of reforms introduced after 1946 which gave effect to the 
recommendations by the Beveridge Report (Beveridge, 1942), but with a focus on ‘subsistence’ rather 
than ‘survival’, more comprehensive provision, and a re -affirmation of the ‘primacy of social 
insurance’. The aim was to establish a system of ‘benefits in return for contributions ’ rather than ‘free 
allowances from the State’. That meant, initially at least, flat-rate benefits for flat-rate contributions 
instead of earnings-related support of the kind provided on the Continent (Wikeley, Ogus and Barendt, 
2002: 4). Whilst a parallel system of National Assistance was available for those not covered by 
contributory benefits, the expectation of near-full employment meant the need for large-scale 




The post-World War II system, through until the 1970s, was helped by labour market conditions in 
which most sectors had a generally stable wages and occupational benefits floor, helped by 
functioning redistributive mechanisms like collective bargaining, National Joint Industrial Council 
terms and conditions, and wages councils’ orders setting minimum wages and conditions in the low 
pay sectors. Much of this period, at least until the depression of the 1930s, met Beveridge’s key 
assumption which was ‘full employment’. Furthermore, in a key expectation first signalled by 
Beveridge in Full Employment in a Free Society – unemployment periods were usually short, and 
claimants could expect advertised jobs to be at ‘fair wages, and of such a kind, and so located that 
[they] could reasonably be expected to take them’ (Beveridge (1944), 2017: 18). Unemployed 
claimants could be expected to be available for work but had important rights in the process - 
particularly in comparison with today’s JSA claimants. The main one was that work opportunities 
which they were asked to consider generally had to meet ‘suitability’ criteria. This meant that within 
limits they could decline work opportunities that fell below prevailing wage rates in their area,  having 




and adjudicators had some discretion in determining what was, or was not, in line with the terms 
offered by ‘good employers’ for these purposes (for example under National Insurance Act 1946 
s.13(5)). This undoubtedly helped to maintain labour market conditions, particularly by not seeing 
them undermined by new entrants being expected to accept conditions below prevailing rates. Unlike 
today, unions were sufficiently strong to be able to ‘police’ sectoral conditions in which collective 
agreements operated. A stark contrast with current labour market conditions.  
Most out-of-work claimants, while they relied on State support, could expect income replacement to 
be provided at a rate which bore some resemblance to what they had been earning – at least in the 
initial phase of their benefits award; and which was an advance on the ‘survival’ rates of the dole in 
the 1930s. It was, to that extent, an insurance-based system. In the bigger picture it could be said that 
the system was ‘made to serve the wider goals of labour market regulation and the preservation of 
labour market standards’ (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: 167).  
Weaknesses in the Contributory System  
There were some systemic weaknesses, too, in the model. By the 1960s and 1970s cracks in the 
system’s ability to deliver support were appearing. A system of flat-rate NI contributions, set at rates 
which were low enough for all contributor groups to afford, produced a system that was under-funded 
(at least without Treasury top-ups for the National Insurance Fund, which governments were reluctant 
to provide). This meant that benefits rates had to be set at low levels, putting in doubt one of 
Beveridge’s central claims which was that the system would improve on the previous schemes’ ability 
to provide ‘survival’-level benefits, and secure a universal level of ‘subsistence’ support. The later 
introduction of earnings-related components helped to ease the problem, but this came at the price 
of additional complexity and differentiation between claimant groups.
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As significant in terms of the long-term implications, there were some sizeable groups on the 
periphery of the labour market who found it difficult to integrate into mainstream, settled 
employment, and who as a result of gaps in their contributions record remained on the edges of the 
contributory system. These included the disabled, long-term incapacitated, carers, and single parent 
families. These were among the groups who had to look to the default scheme provided by the 
National Assistance scheme for support (or additional support) from new non-contributory, non-
means-tested schemes like Mobility Allowance and Invalid Carers Allowance (later becoming Disability 
Living Allowance, Attendance Allowance, and Carers Allowance).  
In time, means-tested schemes like Supplementary Benefit (later Income Support) had to provide a 
low-level, income safety-net for a range of groups unable to access contributory benefits or who were 
unable to access them at a level that was sufficient to guarantee ‘subsistence’. Like today’s means-
tested schemes they were funded out of taxation and borrowing rather than through NICs-based 
eligibility. Single parent households by the 1970s were faring badly, even after the expansion of family 
allowances. They certainly featured strongly in poverty studies, including those of Peter Townsend’s 
Poverty in the UK and earlier LSE-based research in which he was involved (Townsend, 1979). Having 
been refused the support Beveridge identified as necessary
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, by the 1970s they were still largely 
dependent on a combination of voluntary sources, non-contributory benefits like Supplementary 




a group, on the radar of review bodies like the Finer Committee and figured strongly in 
recommendations for improved support (Finer Report, 1974).
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The Expansion of Means-Tested Benefits  
Family Income Supplement (FIS) marked the start of an expansion of means-tested support which 
targeted low-income working families, including single parents. However, there was only mixed 
success as a result of poor take-up, and high withdrawal rates when recipients tried to progress to 
better-paid work. Nevertheless, despite resistance by sections of the government, some unions, and 
organisations like the Child Poverty Action Group which favoured adapting and improving National 
Insurance and universal benefits like family allowances, FIS undoubtedly paved the way for later 
intensification of means-testing with Family Credit and Earnings Top-Up (and, in time, tax credits and 
Universal Credit). Although schemes like FIS were adapted in the UK, and variants were introduced in 
Ireland (continuing until their recent replacement by Working Parent Payment) , they were seen as 
expensive to resource.  
Single parents were among a number of groups, including disabled and longer-term incapacitated 
claimants), who could experience significant problems from the social security system. The system did 
little to encourage or support the take-up of employment – not least because of a lack of childcare 
support to facilitate this. But the system operated to discourage take-up of employment in other ways. 
This included having to run the gauntlet of sanctioning mechanisms like the ‘voluntary leaving’ and 
‘industrial misconduct’ rules. By the mid-1970s sanctioning for these infringements was increasingly 
common, as borne out in the literature of Claimants Union groups.
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Such disincentives meant that 
employment could often just be for short-term periods in the labour market. This, in turn, impacted 
on the ability to build up a National Insurance record, or access contributory benefits.  
The transition away from national insurance was also accompanied by labour market changes 
throughout the 1980s. These saw a sustained attack on redistributive mechanisms like collective 
bargaining, rescission of the Fair Wages Resolution (Bercusson, 1982), and the abolition of wages 
councils which set minimum wages in low pay sectors. Unsurprisingly, dependency on in-work support 
increased as wages fell. But there were other changes which served to undermine the contributory 
principle, and which also weakened labour market standards. Among other things, a duty to ‘seek 
work actively’ as a condition for getting and maintaining support had been progressively reintroduced 
from earlier periods and started to occupy an important role in the process of claiming benefits, and 
particularly out-of-work benefits. This was seen, for example, with the plethora of requirements linked 
to the Claimant Commitment with Jobseeker’s Allowance (changes which  began when conditionality 
was intensified for both contribution and income-based versions of JSA by the Jobseekers Act 1995 
and regulations). The Act reconfigured the two main conditions for eligibility for out-of-work support, 
notably the ‘market conditions’ of being available for work and actively seeking work.
9 
It also 
shortened the periods before a claimant had to re-qualify for support and ensured that ‘good cause’ 
reasons for not pursuing or taking up job offers could no longer include an objection to the level of 
remuneration on offer.  
Such changes were undoubtedly a further cause of the wages and conditions floor, and labour market 
standards, being weakened – adding to the impact of deregulation of the Labour Law system, and 




a progressive decline in earnings levels, jobcentres could also expect them to take up increasingly 
insecure forms of employment like work on ‘on call’ and zero hours contract terms, with little or no 
reference to qualitative aspects of that work (either in terms of wages, hours, or other conditions). 
Indeed, this has been seen as a ‘major factor’ in the growth of such precarious work (Adams and 
Deakin, 2014: 19).  
Post-1997 Changes  
The election of a New Labour government in 1997 did not lead to any significant moves to reverse 
such deregulatory policies or re-regulate, as might perhaps have been expected (for example by 
restoring the wages councils or reviving other schemes for raising the wages floor). Reforms were 
largely confined to the introduction of the national living wage as a safety-net for the poorest groups; 
and improvements to the unfair dismissal regime, new family-friendly working measures, and an 
improved statutory recognition regime. The latter initiatives came as part of the objective of building 
workplace ‘fairness’: changes set out in New Labour’s Fairness at Work White Paper in 1998. On the 
social security side, however, some of the changes were transformative, directed for the most part at 
constructing a new edifice of welfare-to-work and in-work support schemes in support of ‘active’ 
labour market approaches (Puttick, 1999). The chosen instrument for moving large numbers of out-
of-work benefits claimants, including sizeable groups like lone parents, longer-term incapacitated 
workers, and older labour market returnees, into work was the tax credit. With the introduction of a 
new suite of tax credits – Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit since the Tax Credits Act 2002 - 
much of the social security system has been reengineered to promote welfare -to-work transitions, 
and to support retention in low-paid jobs which would otherwise be unsustainable. Much of that 
approach has been retained or replicated in the UC system.  
At the same time, qualification for support from other benefits on a contributions basis  has become 
progressively harder as a result of the introduction of tougher eligibility criteria, time-limiting of 
contribution-based benefits, and switching people to means-tested variants of the same benefit. 
Eligibility criteria for contributory JSA, for example, has been ratchetted up by successive changes 
since 1995 so that now a plethora of complex conditions operate.
11 
Even where benefits like 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Universal Credit can be claimed on a contributory basis, periods of 
take-up of the contributory versions of support have been drasti cally shortened. As a result, 
notwithstanding what may be a lengthy NI contributions record, recipients are typically given no 
choice but to switch to a mix of non-contributory support and means-tested, income-based variants 
after short periods of support (generally with an accompanying intensification of ‘conditionality’ as 
well as demanding conditions for retaining eligibility).  
Concern about the curtailment of eligibility for contribution-based incapacity benefits like 
Employment and Support Allowance, as it has been replacing Incapacity Benefit (IB), coupled with the 
system’s tougher review processes – the antithesis of what the contributory principle was intended 
to do for people who have already paid their NICs, and established eligibility - has been wide-ranging. 
It has been particularly evident from the evidence provided by those forced to migrate from IB to ESA. 
A particularly enlightening account was provided by a long-term IB claimant, Tricia Long, writing about 
her experiences in her ‘Diary of a Benefit Scrounger’ (Long, 2013).
 
Among other things the process 
meant that after receiving contributory ESA for 365 days she was automatically transferred to the 




working above a weekly maximum threshold of 24 hours. Despite having a serious and debilitating 
epilepsy condition she was, like many others in her position, put straight into the work-related activity 
group (WRAG) which assumed an ability to take up employment ‘with support’.  
Other negative features of the transition away from a contribution-based insurance style system have 
been described by Kate Bell and Declan Gaffney in Making a Contribution: Social Security for the Future 
(Bell and Gaffney, 2012). As they point out, the relative rise in costs of participation in the NI system, 
with almost a doubling of contribution costs, has not resulted in an increase in entitlements. In fact, 
quite the opposite, with what they describe as a ‘nothing for something’ Welfare State given the 
‘successive cuts’ in NI benefits. Despite this, they see scope for an important continuing role for the 
contributory principle, particularly in helping to rebuild support for the social security system. The 
authors advocated newer approaches, including options for earnings or contributions-based top-ups 
for other benefits, and ‘crediting-in’ schemes to enfranchise workers earning below the Lower Earning 
Limit for NI contributions, coupled with increasing contributions from employers for those in short 
hours jobs – something which would not just extend coverage but offset excessive incentives to offer 
lower working hours jobs (Bell and Gaffney, 2012: 4-8, 29-35).  
In practice, much of the changes to the benefits system, including moves towards means-tested in-
work benefits like WTC and UC, have been taking place against a back-drop of labour market 
transformations that have seen a range of challenges associated with the rise of the gig economy, and 
an expansion of low hours, low-paid and insecure work.  
This has dictated a need for significant reforms to the Labour Law regime. But it also points to an 
urgent review of social security policies and schemes like UC, and policy approaches to ‘making work 


















CHAPTER 4  
Making Work Pay  
Introduction  
Gaps in coverage by the contributory system, the low levels at which contributory benefits were paid, 
and growing evidence of poverty in the 1960s and 1970s (Townsend, 1979), were among the catalysts 
for the development of newer, primarily means-tested types of benefit. Out of this came an 
intensification in the use of schemes specifically designed to ‘make work pay’ . MWP benefits operate 
by supplementing the earnings of low-paid workers – mainly through support from in-work benefits, 
in combination with tax-based mechanisms. The growth of such support represents, by far, the biggest 
expansion of the modern Welfare State in recent times, assisting millions of workers in the bottom 
thirty per cent of the wage distribution and their families. This can also be measured in terms of the 
rising costs of tax credits and linked support. These rose from £7 billion a year in the mid-1990s to £32 
billion in 2011 (Joyce, 2018). The peak in 2011 reflected the rise in claims during the financial and 
economic crises after 2007 - a period when it has been said the system was ‘propping up’ a sizeable 
part of the labour market as hours and wages were cut, wage rises frozen, and workplace 
reorganisations were a common response to the recession (WERS, 2011: 7).  
Once the rising number of claims (and cost) of in-work Housing Benefit is factored in, it is not difficult 
to see how reliant the labour market has become on State support, well after the crises. By 2015 the 
number of such claims was still rising, even though claims from the rest of the HB cohort were falling 
(‘Housing Benefit Claimants’ in JRF/MacInnes et al, 2015).  
 
There have been various policy rationales for successive governments’ use of MWPs, particularly when 
promoting the idea that a job is the ‘best route out of poverty’ for those on out-of-work benefits, and 
the ‘best form of welfare’ for those being encouraged to take up more employment if they are to come 
out of the kind of low hours, low paid, and often insecure mini-jobs now being seen across the labour 
market. The most important one is that it is more cost-effective to support people who are in work 
rather than unemployed – not least because the unemployed will have a wider range of needs (and 
costs) to be met.  
 
However, there are other considerations. By subsidising low wages through the Social Security system, 
the State is also supporting another key stakeholder, employers. State support reduces employers’ 
labour costs and other costs and on-costs employers would otherwise have to meet. Tax credit 
payments from schemes like WTC and UC supplement other areas of expenditure like childcare which 
would otherwise have to be paid for by workers from their taxed wages. The system is less pre-
occupied with welfare-to-work transitions than it once was. Nevertheless, this is still an area in which 
schemes like UC have attractions from a policy perspective, and for employers. Fiscal transfers to new 
staff reduce employers’ start-up costs and on-going employment costs. They also mean minimum 
wage rates can be set at a lower level than would otherwise be necessary (HM Treasury, 2000: 16). 
However, tax credits can also produce a range of other effects,  not all of them beneficial: for example 
employing organisations are given a powerful disincentive to raise the contractual wage, and bargain 
with staff on pay and employment conditions – something that is likely to be particularly relevant in 




of take-up of tax credits and other in-work State support. Furthermore, wages can reduce to below 
previously established ‘going rates’ as a result of the State's subsidy. 
 
Having massively expanded the support for low hours, low-paid work through UC, it was perhaps 
inevitable that the system would be modified to put in-work UC recipients under pressure to take on 
more hours and better-paid work in order to try to contain the costs involved. This has been done by 
extending conditionality (and potential sanctioning) to this group. Under the 'mandatory in-work 
progression' scheme workers are generally expected to increase their hours or take on better-paid 
work to the point where they reach their prescribed Conditionality Earnings Threshold: this usually 
equates to a 35-hour week at NLW (Puttick, 2018). 
 
For the self-employed, mandatory progression takes another form. Although UC provides a valuable 
resource, especially for nascent operations in which the person (or group) may be struggling to 
establish a sustainable level of self-employed earnings, the State’s support comes with conditions. The 
main one is that once the DWP accepts the operation is viable, and an award of  UC is made, the 
claimant will be assumed to be earning at a level that aligns with what the DWP decides should be the 
prescribed earnings threshold. The award is calculated on the basis of the Minimum Income Floor 
provisions in the UC Regulations, and an award made on the basis of earnings that are presumed to 
be earnt (even if in reality the claimant may be earning considerably less). Despite the obvious 
shortcomings (and injustice) of this approach the MIF scheme is now a core component in the whole 
UC edifice.  
 
Making Work Pay and Tax  
 
MWP schemes now operate in many countries, and take different forms (Adireksombat and Jinjarak, 
2008) including tax, in-work benefits, welfare-led regulatory interventions, and minimum wage-
setting. Tax mechanisms range from simple schemes like tax allowances or minimum thresholds at 
which liability of low earners begins - or which confer ‘credits’ on taxpayers in ways that perform a 
similar function
1 
- to more sophisticated schemes that extend to repayments of tax already paid. 
Examples include the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA which assists earners on a low to moderate 
income and reduces the amount of tax they pay or provides refunds (or both).
2 
The UK has, at different 
times, developed new approaches to the use of the tax regime as a means of delivering support, but 
with mixed success. The Conservative government of Edward Heath, in the face of mounting evidence 
of in-work poverty and the failure of Family Income Supplement, wanted to introduce a tax credit 
scheme which would enable employers to reduce the amount of tax deducted from wages for 
employees with ‘credits’, and make cash payments to those with unused credits (with a default power 
of the Inland Revenue to make payments and reimbursements if the employer did not do so).  
 
The scheme was not, in the end, implemented. This was mainly on account of its cost, the likely need 
to raise income tax or VAT to pay for it, and the Heath government’s preoccupation with the miners 




Later landmarks in the use of the tax system to direct support to the low-paid included Gordon 
Brown’s ‘10 pence starting rate’. The controversial decision to jettison this in order to finance a 2-
pence cut in the basic rate of income tax was politically very damaging. As the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies has observed, it is often a mistake to try to make a snap judgment about the impact of  such 
changes – particularly when other changes have been made to mitigate their impact (Chote/IFS, 2008). 
Closer scrutiny by the IFS showed how, in fact, it was the poorest third of the population which 




The current regime for tackling low pay still looks to the personal tax allowance as a way of delivering 
support. However, in fiscal terms it is not cheap. For example, in 2018 the Office for Budget 
Responsibility estimated that it would cost £1.4 billion to raise the PTA to £12,500; and this prompted 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation to argue convincingly that ‘this money would be better spent helping 
to pay the lion’s share of increased work allowances’ (JRF, 2018a: 2).  
 
Tax Credits and UC  
 
In the UK the most important element within the range of MWP mechanisms currently in use is the 
tax credit, now being progressively replaced by ‘credits’ under the UC system.
5 
Tax credits have been 
a major feature of the system since New Labour made it a core ‘Duty of Government’  in the New 
Welfare Contract to ensure that work should always pay (DSS, 1998a). The Coalition and later 
Conservative governments followed suite in 2010 and 2017 by committing to the idea and to the 
system (DWP, 2010a; DWP, 2010b; Conservative Manifesto, 2017: 16). It is a combination of three 
measures – the national living wage, tax allowances, and tax credits - which determines the precise 
income ‘take’ of a low-paid worker from their employer and the State. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the 
culmination of the Budget 2018 speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, came 
with his example of the impact of the changes made through the PTA, benefits rates, and NLW on a 
single parent working part-time. He said:  
 
‘As a result of the announcements I have made today a single parent, receiving Universal Credit, and 
working 25 hours a week on National Living Wage will benefit by £890 next year. The hard work  of the 
British people paying off in hard cash in their pockets. We have turned an important corner now we 
must pull together to build the bright, prosperous future that is within Britain’s grasp if we choose to 
seize it, embracing change not hiding from it, building on the inherent strength of the British economy 
and the indomitable spirit of the British people…austerity is coming to an end’.   
  
In the UK it is the fiscal payments made by HMRC and the DWP to workers and the self-employed 
under the Working Tax Credit (WTC) or Universal Credit (UC) schemes that are, in value terms, the 
most important component in the UK’s MWP system. It is certainly the primary means of 
supplementing earnings and is likely to remain to remain so - at least until other redistributive 
mechanisms can be developed which will reduce dependency on them.  
 
Although they are described as ‘credits’, payments are, conceptually, simply payments made to 
workers by the relevant welfare agency: HMRC (in the case of tax credits) or the DWP if it is UC. Like 




earnings, but also any other available ‘income’, including a partner’s) with the elements, allowances, 
amounts, etc for which the claimant is eligible (and taking into account any prescribed income 
‘disregards’ for which claimants may be eligible). Transfers are made by HMRC (or in the case of UC, 
the DWP) straight into people’s bank accounts.
6 
As with other income-related benefits the amount of 
support, including assistance with childcare, housing costs, etc then change f rom time to time in 
response to the recipient’s changing needs earnings, income, and capital resources – but also their 
needs. 
Support from Universal Credit  
 
The desire to mimic wages in the way such payments are made – previously a feature with early forms 
of WTC - has been carried over into UC, often with highly negative consequences. This can be seen, 
for example, in the monthly intervals at which UC payments are made, supposedly replicating the way 
wages are paid. Under UC, this starts with a delay in paying the first instalment of UC for at least a 
month (mirroring a ‘wage in hand’ approach that would be taken with monthly paid workers). This has 
led to the build-up of serious debt problems for both job starters and in-work recipients, which has 
necessitated the introduction of loans to claimants facing hardship. The issue featured strongly in a 
House of Commons debate in October 2017 when MPs called for a suspension of the system’s national 
roll-out. In the course of the debate they reported that many of their constituents were experiencing 
debt problems and arrears of unpaid rent, putting their housing at risk, and causing increased reliance 
on food banks. There have been a lot of concerns with UC – but this was certainly a major factor that 
led to the government’s defeat at the end of the debate. Other problems concerned the delays in 
payment of rent to landlords. Again, to mirror the world of work claimants are required to pay their 
rent from the amount of UC they receive (rather than, as before with Housing Benefit, having their 
rent paid directly to the landlord by the local authority). Apart from the difficulties this can cause for 
budgeting purposes, if mistakes are made there is a huge scope for claimants to go into arrears of 
unpaid rent, leaving them vulnerable to eviction. The issues were highlighted in the BBC’s Panorama 
programme The Universal Credit Crisis.8 
 
With the introduction of UC, the system is being massively expanded to encompass a whole new 
generation of ‘mini-jobs’, by extending eligibility for in-work support to jobs which are below the 16 
hours a week minimum threshold for Working Tax Credit. The concern with this has been that the 
system is, in fact, helping to spawn such employment - much of it which is not just low-paid, but short-
term and subject to poor working conditions. This was a concern for the Commons Select Committee 
on Work and Pensions
9
, and organisations like the Institute for Fiscal Studies and Resolution 
Foundation which provided the evidence on which the committee’s conclusions were bas ed. 
Nevertheless, this aspect of UC is still seen by policy makers as a vital one in supporting the  
government’s job creation strategy of creating and sustaining such new work , coupled with 
expectations that, with ‘support’, the job-holders will progress to better things. As discussed in chapter 
6, that ‘progression’ is generally mandatory, with job-holders being required to take on additional 
hours or better-paid employment until the prescribed Conditionality Earnings Threshold has been 
reached.  
 
Interestingly, other countries like the Republic of Ireland which have been developing MWP 




sectors, have avoided going down the path of providing State subsidisation of low hours work. The 
Working Family Payment scheme not only requires an initial eligibility criterion of 38 hours a fortnight 
as the minimum threshold of weekly working hours, it also prescribes that awards will automatically 
end if working hours fall below that threshold. The scheme operates, effectively, as an incentive for 
employers to maintain a stable pattern of hours, and also limits the scheme to those who are 
employees. Periods of ‘self-employment’ do not count and cannot be aggregated with periods of 





Tax Credits & UC: Building Up the Floor?  
 
Before returning to consider the minimum wage and UC schemes in more detail, it is necessary to 
look, first, at the policy objectives for each scheme, and how they inter-act. Conceptually, successive 
governments’ approach since the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 came into operation has been to 
use the NMW to raise the floor to what the Low Pay Commission determines year-by-year is an 
affordable minimum level of earnings, with employers paying above that minimum when they can 
afford to do so. However, it is the tax credits system which operates as the more distinctive ‘welfare’ 
measure (HM Treasury, 2002; Simpson, 2004: 24). A further difference between the two mechanisms’ 
aims must also be understood, particularly regarding the way distinct groups are targeted for support. 
The primary purpose of the NMW is to secure a higher basic wage for low-paid workers through a 
legal intervention in their contracts of employment. It is, in effect, just a means of increasing the 
recipient’s contractual wage, but without prescribing any wider redistributive welfare function. How 
wages are managed or redistributed by workers, and within their families (and as between 
dependants) is generally a matter for their own arrangements, with minimal intervention by the law 
(Pahl, 1990). 
 
Schemes like tax credits and UC are able to target resources according to claimants’ and families’ 
needs, including family size and characteristics – even if in recent years schemes have been 
constrained by limitations like the benefits cap and bar on support through the UC child element for 
more than two children
11
: a controversial change, and one that the government sought to justify on 
the basis that it was needed in order to deliver ‘a fair deal to the taxpayer’ and to ‘incentivise work’ 
(Machin, 2017: 7). The restriction was made by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, s.13, and all 
the surrounding information about the change was that it was, quite simply, a cut to benefits 
expenditure driven by austerity priorities. The impact assessment said that the change would affect 
over half a million families.  
 
One of the distinct disadvantages of using means-tested benefit schemes like tax credits and UC as a 
way of topping up earnings is that recipients can be caught in a poverty trap which requires measures 
like the work allowances scheme to raise the level at which benefits start to be withdrawn, in 
conjunction with tapers which prescribe the rate of that withdrawal. The difficulties associated with 





Before examining that further, consideration is given to national minimum wage-setting, and its 



































CHAPTER 5  
Raising the Wages Floor? The NMW and Regulated Collective Bargaining   
Introduction 
One of the primary functions of a modern social protection system is to insure people against 
employment-related risks including a lack of ‘basic income security’, and to counter that insecurity. To 
do this, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) sees it as necessary to provide measures like social 
transfers (in cash or kind) or employment guarantees and services which can extend to the ‘working 
poor’ (Bachelet Report, 2011: Executive Summary p.xii). Like the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) the ILO supports minimum wage-setting systems as part of its 
Decent Work agenda and Conventions.
1 
A more recent focus has been on examining the reasons why 
such mechanisms, in themselves, are not achieving the progress which the ILO would like to see in 
addressing areas as workplace inequalities (particularly as they affect women), and in raising wages 
and securing Decent Work standards in sectors like the gig economy (ILO, 2018) .  
Practice varies between countries in the way minimum wage-setting operates, and the ILO produced 
a survey of national schemes in 2014 (ILO, 2014).
2 
Informed by the survey and national reports on 
employment conditions, minimum wage-setting is regarded as valuable in a range of contexts – but 
particularly where systems like collective bargaining are not operating effectively or have weakened, 
and where a general minimum wage floor is required. Germany opted for a national minimum wage 
in 2015 for those reasons. Until then, the German government saw the adoption of a general minimum 
wage as unnecessary as it had a well-developed system of sectoral bargaining and other arrangements 
in place. The position had been changing, however, and pressure for a national minimum wage came 
from the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), the German Confederation of Trade Unions, and the 
SPD, the government’s coalition partner. Both the SPD and the DGB argued that this was needed to 
create a national ‘safety net’ and to help to prevent the continuing erosion of wages in sectors where 
existing wage-setting arrangements were not working – either because of the reluctance of social 
partners to negotiate, or as a result of the existing system’s ‘shrinking coverage’ (ILO , 2014:186).
3 
 
In the UK’s case wage regulation has long been a double -edged sword with pay constraint playing as 
big a role as systems to raise the wages floor, and with restrictions going back as far as the Ordinance 
of Labourers 1349. This was introduced after the Black Death decimated the population, and the 
impact on the workforce produced a rise in labour costs. More recently, the ability of the government 
to impose pay freezes, including restrictions on public sector pay, was seen with the public sector pay 
cap. That ‘cap’ only began to be withdrawn in 2018, paving the way for an NHS pay award 5. 
Mechanisms to raise pay levels have developed in piece-meal ways, and have included collective 
bargaining, National Joint Industrial Council agreements, wages councils’ orders, Fair Wages 
Resolutions, and ‘living wage’ clauses in the public procurement process6. However, most  of those 
measures have either been abolished or, as in the case of collective bargaining, operate within a highly 
restrictive legal environment. The National Minimum Wage (NMW), introduced in 1998, has been the 
only significant new redistributive intervention in the last 20 years. 7   
 
With the decline of collective bargaining, and the abolition of regulated sectoral bargaining and wage-
setting when the wages councils were finally abolished in 1993 – a decision that flew in the face of 




redistributive mechanisms in areas of the labour market not covered by collective agreements are just 
the minimum wage and State in-work benefits. Yet despite innovations l ike the introduction of the 
NLW, coupled with a sizeable investment in tax credits, UC, and Housing Benefit/UC housing costs the 
system is still failing to halt the rise in low paid work and in-work poverty. 
 
With these points in mind, consideration can be given to the minimum wage system, and to proposals 
for new approaches to raising the wage floor, including ideas for sectoral wage -setting and the 
introduction of regulated collective bargaining.  
 
The NMW’s Role  
The UK’s minimum wage system was introduced in 1998 in the aftermath of deregulation of the labour 
market, and a weakened wages floor – particularly as a result of the assault on collective bargaining 
and the abolition of wages councils as they set wage minima in low pay sectors. Much of the challenge 
then, as now, was on how a ‘fair minimum standard of pay’ could be produced on the back of the new 
statutory minimum wage floor. The Treasury's view was that this could be achieved in conjunction 
with five other mechanisms for dealing with low pay, namely a low rate of income tax; measures to 
take low earners out of National Insurance liability; tax credits; childcare costs paid with tax credits 
(rather than as a separate income ‘disregard’ as had been the position with Family Income Supplement 
and Family Credit); and assistance with mortgage and rental costs (HM Treasury, 2000: 8). Since then, 
successive governments have continued to regard all these mechanisms as important. A lot less 
attention has been given to the potential that a return to sectoral wage-setting could play in 
addressing the considerable variations there are between conditions in different sectors: a point 
recognised by, among others, the General Secretary of the TUC when she called for a return to wages 
councils (O’Grady, 2013). Nor has the continuing potential for collective bargaining, at all levels, 
received the attention it needs: an issue which is picked up again later.      
 
Besides ‘fairness’, the case for the minimum wage rests on some significant economic arguments, and 
a narrative about the negative impact of low pay on productivity, public finances, and fiscal costs. The 
key concerns are that the availability of under-valued labour has negative influences on organisations, 
for example by enabling them to maintain organisational and other management inefficiencies, delay 
the scrapping of obsolete equipment, and engage in ‘destructive price competition’: besides that, low 
pay has negative obvious consequences for public finances as social security spending rises, as it did 
after labour market deregulation and the decline in wage levels after 1979 (Deakin and Wilkinson, 
1996). In their analysis the authors argued that ‘Wage subsidisation encourages employers to pay 
lower wages and the means-tested Family Credit discourages workers from pressing for or seeking out 
higher wages by imposing a high marginal tax rate on any increases they secure’.  
Such considerations remain very relevant in identifying current policy priorities: but at the same time 
there are several discernible tasks for the NMW. First, to provide a national minimum earnings floor 
on which in-work welfare schemes can then build. Second, to set that minimum floor at a level which 
establishes a fair division of responsibility between employers and the community. It was observed by 
the government in 2002 in its evidence to the Low Pay Commission that the NMW was not intended 




which employers could improve; and which the State could supplement with tax cre dits.
8 
To that 
extent, schemes like in-work UC perform part of the ‘basic income security’ function envisaged by ILO 
principles.    
In fixing the floor the Low Pay Commission is mindful about factors like the potential impact of 
excessive rises on employers’ ability to pay, and the implications for job creation and on wage 
progression. There are a number of points which the LPC takes into account in carrying out its research 
ahead of minimum wage recommendations going to the Secretary of State each year. In  2018, a year 
in which Brexit became an additional concern for the process, the focus stayed firmly on the likely 
impact of a rise on working hours, wages, recruitment – but also the economic outlook. Brexit was 
just one of several issues for consideration. One of the concerns with the minimum wage system, 
currently, is with the phenomenon of wage compression at the bottom of the distribution. This is 
where staff on low pay tend to be concentrated around the minimum prescribed rate, which then 
tends to become a ‘going rate’ at the bottom of the wage distribution – particularly if there no other 
incentives to prompt employers to pay above that level. This, in turn, may mean employers make less 
resources available to fund progression to higher rates. Such ‘compression’ has already been a notable 
feature of pay in several low pay sectors like Accommodation and Food Services where almost half 
the workforce is on, or close to, the minimum pay rate (Resolution Foundation, 2016: 10).  
More recently, austerity and a roll-back in the value of in-work social security, has meant that the 
National Living Wage (NLW) – introduced in 2015 to coincide with the start of cuts to the value of tax 
credits - is now set to play a bigger role in raising the wages floor. The NLW has some negative features, 
however. It operates as a modification to the original NMW scheme, paying an enhanced rate to 
eligible adults aged 25 and over (£7.83 at 2018-19 rates): but it then differentiates on age grounds by 
setting lower rates, even though younger workers may be doing exactly the same job
9
. Unions like 
USDAW, representing low-paid staff, have campaigned against this highly negative aspect of the 
scheme
10
. The Institute of Fiscal Studies has gone as far as to describe a larger than expected rise in 
the minimum wage as a ‘major policy lever’ that is being pulled to try to prop up low earners: 
something which has produced a higher growth at the bottom of the hourly wage distribution than in 
past years (Joyce, 2018). But they will certainly need it. Groups like the ‘just about managing’ (JAMS) 
have been among those hardest-hit by cuts to in-work support and benefits, and the prospects in 2019 
and beyond do not look bright (Finch, 2018).  
 
Clearly there is a need for new approaches, including the introduction of sectoral pay bargaining in 
sectors where the NMW and NLW are not working effectively or being paid at a level that is sufficient 
to avoid having to claim in-work benefits. The care sector is an example where the challenges can be 
at their greatest. Dr Lydia Hayes of Cardiff University has argued convincingly that introducing 
collective bargaining into this sector would offer the best means of preventing the exploitation of care 
workers and carers. At the same time, a better remunerated workforce, working to improved 
conditions, would also help to improve the care standards experienced by the care system’s users 
(Hayes, 2017). 
In the meantime, homecare workers continue to experience major issues of non-compliance with the 
minimum wage legislation. Among other problems, workers are routinely underpaid for the hours that 




spent travelling between home appointments. Measures like the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(Itemised Pay Statement) (Amendment) Order 2018, SI 2018/147 from 6
th 
April 2019, will go some way 
towards dealing with how pay is made up. However, this does not eliminate all the problems that have 
been causing workers in this sector to be short-changed, as a commentary on the problem and the 
Order by Kate Ewing has explained (Ewing, 2018). In a presentation at an IER conference ‘Access to 
Justice’ (8
th 
February 2017) she referred to some of the reasons why care workers do not receive their 
full entitlements under the NMW Act, including vulnerability and isolation of the workforce and low 
awareness of their rights. As she noted, the system for calculating hourly pay is very complicated. 
Routes to enforcement, whether through a tribunal or HMRC, also remain highly problematic. Unison 
are among the unions campaigning to get improvements to these and other aspects of the syste m. 
Meanwhile, there are plenty of other areas of the NMW scheme where there is still significant non-
compliance, for example the position over NMW remuneration when workers are expected to ‘sleep 
in’ and be ‘available for work’ rather than actually working. In the latter case they can expect to be 
paid at the NMW rate for the whole of the shift, whereas according to recent court decisions they 
cannot
11
.  Decisions like this add to the financial pressures on workers and mean that they are even 
more likely to be reliant on State earnings ‘top-ups’ from tax credits or UC if the jobs are to be 
sustainable. There are also some significant compliance issues with groups like agency workers who 
may still not receive the information they are entitled to in regulations that can be as important as the 
NMW Regulations: typically, when they need to know what shifts and hours they will be working, and 
therefore what pay they can expect on particular days or nights. 
 
Low Hours & ‘Progression’ Challenges  
Despite regulatory interventions from the NMW there is still a sizeable cohort of workers who simply 
do not work sufficient hours to generate enough pay to make their work sustainable without State 
support. Typically, this includes parents having to combine a job with childcare responsibilities, carers 
with responsibilities for disabled or older family members, older returnees to the labour market, and 
disabled and incapacitated workers who are limited in their ability to work longer hours. Besides such 
groups who have always had difficulties working a standard full -time week, the labour market is 
currently seeing a more general expansion of low hours, part-time jobs; and this is coinciding with the 
roll-out of Universal Credit a system of support, that has been tailor-made to support such 
employment (SSAC, 2017). In the absence of any expectation that employers should be under pressure 
to pay above NMW rates for low hours employment, and with the availability of support for such 
employment from the Universal Credit system, it is axiomatic that employers will be massively 
incentivised to create more and more of this kind of work. The problem, however, as a House of 
Commons committee has observed, is that this kind of mini-job is often associated with poor 
conditions and career prospects (Work and Pensions Committee, 2016: 4) – as it was informed by 
evidence from the Institute of Fiscal Studies and Resolution Foundation (IFS, 2016; Resolution 
Foundation, 2014a). Assisted by the evidence from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, it also noted 
how there is a ‘strong correlation between low pay and job insecurity’ (JRF/Thompson, 2015: 4; 
JRF/Tinson et al, 2016). Fast turnover was seen as a further feature of such work, with four in ten 





The problem is that Universal Credit is clearly helping to create and maintain such highly subsidised 
work, while it is not delivering the kind of support that many of the workers in such employment 
actually need. 
 
The ability to subsidise low hours, low paid work was one of the primary policy drivers for UC when it 
was being designed, as will be considered in the next chapter. In order to counter the incentives for 
people to stay ‘parked’ in such work the government developed mandatory progression as an integral 
component in the UC scheme, with workers being expected under their Claimant Commitment to 
‘progress’ to further work, or better-paid work, until they have finally attained their prescribed 
conditionality earnings threshold (CET). In most cases this usually equates to 35 hours a week at the 
NLW rate. It is not entirely clear when that policy was dreamt up. The ‘why’ is better understood. The 
idea has been that if only people working limited hours and in poorly-paid work could be sufficiently 
incentivised to find work with more hours and, ideally, better pay, the problem could be overcome 
(Department for Business, 2015: 5). Thus was born the ‘duty to progress’, backed up by formali sed in-
work benefits conditionality and sanctioning.  
 
Plainly, the minimum pay scheme is not flexible enough to address such variable hours and 
‘progression’ problems. Nor can it, as schemes like wages council orders used to do (and could 
stipulate), require employers to construct and maintain pay grade systems, or set the qualifications 
and other criteria for intra-grade progression. Indeed, one of the basic problems with the NMW is that 
it requires very little from an employer besides delivery of a level  of pay which is barely above 
subsistence. This means, in practical terms, it is the State welfare system that has to do most of the 
heavy lifting in terms of bearing the resulting costs and on-costs of securing a basic subsistence level 
‘wage’. It does nothing, in itself, to facilitate wage progression. In comparison, the model provided by 
the wages council system, and still maintained by several of  the remaining Agricultural Wages Boards, 
has the potential to require employers to go much further. The Agricultural Wages (Wales) Order 
2018, Part 2, for example, lays down a series of rates which then provides the basis for a grade 
structure that offers progression. This is linked to the acquisition of qualifications and experience 
necessitating investment in training and education
13
. Other schemes such as the Scottish Agricultural 
Wages Order 2018
14 
provide for a universal rate for all workers, but then caters for additional amounts 
linked to appropriate qualifications. As important for some groups, unlike the NMW scheme the 
orders prescribe minimum overtime rates for all workers which are substantially higher than the basic 





NMW: Successes and Failures  
 
The NMW has been successful in reducing – but not completely abolishing - extreme low pay. Without 
the basic safety-net it maintains a sizeable section of the bottom end of the wage distribution would 
be in ‘absolute poverty’. It is also the case that minimum wage -setting coupled with well targeted and 
adequately resourced schemes provide an important base-line from which wages and structures 
further up the distribution can be developed. This was evident i n the ways some European social 
security systems worked more effectively than others in the financial crisis after 2007 (Mai, 2008: 11-




and other State interventions and support plays an essential part in countering the effects that low 
wages can have in depressing household consumption and maintaining demand in the economy 
(Bonnet et al, 2012; Stiglitz, 2009).  
 
Beyond that, however, the UK’s scheme has some significant limitations. In the first place it is not 
currently pitched at a high enough level to even ensure that a couple with two children, both adults 
in full-time work in jobs on the NLW, has sufficient money each week to reach a 
‘no frills’ basic standard of living. That standard is based on the Minimum Income Standard, a set of 
criteria produced by the Centre for Research in Policy at Loughborough University: it is based on 
essential items like accommodation, clothing, and food and the cost of ‘taking part in society’ (Padley 
and Hirsch, 2017).  
 
The criteria have also helped to inform the costs of bringing up children. In doing so, they have done 
a lot to highlight the limitations of the current low pay regime. According to the Child Poverty Action 
Group, which uses the criteria to analyse current trends, despite the introduction of the NLW the 
earnings have largely been clawed back as a result of benefits and tax credits freezes. More pre cisely, 
a family with two children with both adults working full time at NLW levels is still 11% (£49 per week) 
short of the standard. The cumulative effect of cuts, frozen benefit rates, and tax measures have hit 
lone parents even harder, according to the CPAG (CPAG, 2018b). Even if they are in a reasonably paid 
job, on median earnings, this group will still be, on average, 15% (£56 per week) short of an adequate 
income (mainly as a result of the high cost of childcare). A lone parent employed full-time on the NLW 
will be 20% (£74 per week) short of what is needed for a minimum standard of living. The position is 
worse, however, for a lone parent relying solely on benefits as opposed to just getting benefit top-ups 
from tax credits or UC. It is estimated that they will be as much as 40% short of what is needed (CPAG, 
2018b).  
 
Other studies in 2018 have been showing that interventions like the NMW and NLW coupled with 
general economic conditions, have not been making any discernible impact on earnings. In 2017-18 
the Resolution Foundation estimated that typical incomes increased by just 0.9 per cent (after housing 
costs), which it described as ‘extremely weak’ and representing less than half the average annual 
growth rate between 1994 and 2007. A combination of a benefit freeze and above-target inflation 
meant that real household incomes fell by 0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent among households in the 
bottom third of the income distribution (Corlett et al/Resolution Foundation, 2018). Over a longer 
term, namely between 2003 and 2016-17, wage stagnation has been a feature of income in the lower 
half of the incomes range. One of the outcomes of the Foundation’s audit was a picture of ‘generalised 
stagnation for many’, with ‘lower income households actually going backwards’.  
 
A further concern is with the NMW’s inability to respond to the wide range of differing conditions 
within the different sectors of the UK labour market – even within the ten or so low pay sectors (IPPR, 
2018), let alone the wider labour market. For that reason, the General Secretary of the TUC, Frances 
O’Grady - a former member of the Low Pay Commission (LPC) – has proposed a return to legally 
enforceable minimum wages to be set for different sectors (O’Grady, 2013). Although there are no 
doubt differing views on the wisdom of a return to a wages council system - indeed the trade union 
movement has in the past had a lot of differing views on their worth (Keevash, 1985) - there are some 




From a fiscal perspective it makes little sense to continue with just a general safety-net that sets 
minima for all sectors, and all enterprises within sectors, particularly when some organisations may 
be perfectly capable of paying better wages and conditions. 
 
The Minimum Floor, Wage Ceilings & Reciprocity  
 
Other shortcomings in the present regime have become glaringly obvious, including the propensity of 
the NMW to become a ‘going rate’ rather than a minimum. The intention in 1998 was to set a 
minimum rate. However, by 2013 it was evident that for many employers the NMW had become, 
effectively, both a wages floor and a ceiling (Plunkett and Hurrell, 2013). Clearly, not much is required 
of employers in terms of reciprocity for what they get. Ie a sizeable wage subsidy and substantial help 
from the community with their operating costs. Neither system requires much in terms of 
commitment by an employer to training or structuring of pay schemes that can help with pay and 
career progression. Above all it provides ‘very little upward pressure on employers who could afford 
to pay more’ (Ibid, p.6).  
 
These and other weaknesses in the NMW system featured strongly in the final report of a review led 
by the founding Chair of the LPC, Sir George Bain (Resolution Foundation, 2014b). Bain had been 
concerned for some while that the minimum wage system had become something of a ‘blunt tool’ 
and was in need of overhaul. In particular, he considered that what was needed was a mechanism 
which was more efficient and responsive to employers’ ability to pay. The way he explained this in a 
Guardian article in 2013 was that  
 
‘With a single rate, it will always be hard to raise the rate because you’re worried about employment 
in vulnerable areas. But minimum wages are ill -fitting garments, pinching hard in some places and 
leaving room in others. We need to ask whether there’s more we could do to push up pay in sectors 
that could afford it’ (Bain, 2013).  
 
The report itself raised the question whether the current challenges facing the NMW regime meant it 
was time to debate a move away from the current ‘single legal wage floor’ towards sector-focused 
options. It suggested that these could be informed by evidence from the government and Low Pay 
Commission about the affordability of higher minimum rates in sectors where the evidence indicated 
this was affordable.  
 
Bain Report: Conclusions  
 
The report reached several conclusions about the scope for moving away from the current system of 
wage-setting. In general, it proposed making it an explicit long-term ambition of economic policy to 
reduce the incidence of low pay, specifically by setting out a plan to reduce the share of employees 
who earn below two-thirds of the hourly median wage. It concluded that an ‘ambitious but achievable 
long-term goal was to reduce the UK’s high incidence of low pay from 21 per cent to 17 per cent. This, 
it said, would be a ‘reasonable goal against international bench-marks’. Furthermore, as a single legal 
wage-floor would always be a blunt tool, a key role for the Low Pay Commission should be to 
‘encourage a debate over when employers could go further than the statutory NMW’. The report 




State could help to shift the terms of debate by publishing information. The report’s analysis suggested 
that industrial sectors would be a good way to start, with the Secretary of State for Business asking 
the LPC to publish analysis to show which sectors of the economy could afford to pay more than its 
recommended NMW. Last, it rejected the idea of regional minimum wages, but believed that there 
was a case for London being a special case with a single reference rate: basically, a ‘non-mandatory 
minimum wage creating, in effect, a London-weighting for the NMW.  
 
The analysis put forward by Bain was valuable and highlighted the very real limitations of the current 
NWM scheme. The proposals put forward by Bain, however, were limited in their scope, and for the 
most part were confined to proposing an extension of the existing NMW structure to sectors where 
there might be evidence that in some sectors employers could be paying above the national minimum.  
 
IER: Sectoral Collective Bargaining  
 
In contrast with Bain, the proposals for wage-setting made by the Institute of Employment Rights 
(Ewing et al, 2018: 12-27) form part of a wider-ranging set of detailed proposals for setting up a new 
collective bargaining framework in accordance with a new Collective Bargaining Act. This could 
operate in one workplace or one employer (enterprise-level bargaining, or across a whole sector 
(sectoral bargaining). The system would not remove the need for minimum standards to be set down 
in legislation, which means that the existing minimum wage safety-net and other floor of rights 
legislation would be maintained. As important, the system would cater for a wide variety of aspects 
of the employment relationship, pay being just one. Ie it would extend to matters like pensions, hours, 
holidays, and equal opportunities. Interestingly, the scheme envisages a diminution in the need for a 
‘vast array of legislation currently regulating work’ and diminish the number of cases in which workers 
are ‘forced to litigate’ over entitlements (para. 3.8). It should also start to redress the imbalance of power 
between employers and non-union, 'unorganised' workers described by Anna Pollert in 'The Unorganised 
Worker: The Decline in Collectivism and New Hurdles to Individual Rights (Pollert, 2005). 
 
Once operational, the scheme should assist in reversing the fall in wages which has led to the rise of 
in-work State benefits and wage subsidisation (para. 3.9).  
 
The proposals proceed on the basis that a ‘roll-out of collective bargaining can only be achieved by 
law and sustained government policy’ and could not just be left to the ‘labour market’. To achieve 
collective bargaining and collective agreements on a sectoral basis would necessitate legislation, 
namely a Collective Bargaining Act which would facilitate the establi shment of sectoral joint 
committees (National Joint Industrial Committees), appointed by a Secretary of State for Labour, with 
the possible inclusion of three additional members appointed by the Secretary of State. These would 
negotiate and set minimum terms and conditions across each sector, and the resulting terms would 
apply by operation of law to all workers and employers in the sectors covered ( Ewing et al, 2018: 12-
27).  
 
Employers’ Attitudes to the Minimum Wage/NLW  
 
Interestingly, when the NLW was introduced, a large majority of employers gave little indication that 




10); and the few that were engaging in avoidance actions designed to make savings to fund the 
additional costs did not change that overall picture. The problem merely highlighted the lack of 
measures accompanying the introduction of the NLW: eg mechanisms to secure compliance and 
dissuade employers from taking actions to recoup NLW implementation costs, such as reducing 
overtime, removing premia for week-end and unsocial working, and otherwise making cuts to 
remuneration packages and occupational benefits (Butler, 2016). There was also some evidence of 
moves to employ younger staff to gain the benefit of the lower NLW rates for those aged under 25. 
HR organisations questioned whether, even if it was ‘legal’ to finance the NLW through cuts to ‘perks’, 
it was fair (Faragher, 2016).  
 
Issues around the behaviour of a minority of employers at the time of the introduction of the NLW 
also raised the question whether and to what extent employers have played ball with government 
hopes and expectations that there should be greater efforts to invest in training and create better 
career and wage progression opportunities. The issue is, of course, central to the considerable 
productivity challenges the country faces. But it also links to the worries the government has about its 
‘mandatory progression’ strategy. Without sufficient jobs for those in highly subsidised low hours, or 
low paid mini jobs to progress to better-remunerated employment, the whole strategy is clearly at 
risk. As revisited in the next chapter, the government’s approach has been to rely on a high degree of 
compulsion, with a significant extension of conditionality and sanctioning directed at employed 
recipients of UC. This has been focused on trying to manage the fiscal costs of a high take-up of UC 
among low hours, low paid workers and the self-employed. Mandatory Progression is undoubtedly a 
vital strand in the plans for managing UC as the national roll -out continues.  
 
Much will depend on employers’ co-operation and support for most aspects of the progression 
strategy. Unfortunately, there is every reason to be concerned about many employers’ readiness (or 
willingness) on this score. Employers can and do invest in training. However, this tends to be skewed 
away from those areas of the wages and grade spectrum where investment is needed if the policy of 
trying to move people on low hours, low paid work into the higher-paid work is to succeed. A 
hollowing-out effect is discernible in the middle range of jobs when it comes to opportunities for 
career and wage progression (Gardiner and Corlett, 2015). HR professionals also see financial barriers, 
not least because of the lack of funds for training for parts of the organisation that are not regarded 
as a priority (CIPD, 2014). From the perspective of workers who are also tax credit and UC claimants – 
the group which will come under increasing pressure to take on work opportunities to raise their 
‘conditionality earnings threshold’ – particularly in sectors where low hours and low pay are the norm 
– employers may be reluctant to offer more hours when these are requested. There are a range of 
reasons for this, but a key consideration is that low hours, part-time work may be the dominant, 
standard kind of work (Judge/CPAG, 2015: 28). 
 
Expecting employers to change their practices may prove difficult for DWP Work Coaches – 
particularly in the face of potent tax and National Insurance incentives for employers to maintain part-
time work. At a political level, dismantling the panoply of incentives would be seen as jeopardising the 





In this context it is difficult to see how the government’s wider ‘progression’ agenda, including the 
mandatory In-Work Progression scheme – an integral part of the Universal Credit system - is going to 
be developed as effectively as the government, somewhat naively, envisages.  
 
With these considerations in mind closer attention can now be given to detailed aspects of Universal 

































CHAPTER SIX  
In-Work Support  
Introduction  
True to their promise to carry out the ‘biggest shake up of the welfare and benefits system for sixty 
years’, with Universal Credit as the centrepiece of the reforms, the  UC proposals in 21
st 
Century 
Welfare (DWP, 2010a) and Universal Credit: Welfare that Works (DWP, 2010b) were implemented by 
the Welfare Reform Act 2012 Part 1 and the Universal Credit Regulations 2013. Initial support for UC 
design features was quite strong, particularly given the promise of a simplified means-tested benefits 
scheme. Among the features put forward were clearer eligibility criteria, and improved claims and 
adjudication processes that could track pay and hours changes in ‘real time’ (Puttick , 2012a; 2012b). 
Since then the scheme has been affected by significant cuts and changes, and unfortunately has 
degenerated into a quagmire of failure on just about every front. Unsurprisingly, unions have been 
calling for UC to be scrapped or ‘stopped’
1
. The Commons Public Accounts Committee has described 
the DWP as having a ‘fortress mentality’ - and demanded it jettisons its ‘systemic culture of denial and 
defensiveness’ (PAC, 2018)
2
. A former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (one of the architects of the tax 
credit system), has called for an immediate halt to the UC ‘experiment’, describing the scheme as 
‘cruel and vindictive beyond austerity’ (Brown, 2018)
3
. Another ex-Prime Minister, John Major, has 
warned that UC could well prove to be the government’s ‘poll tax moment’. That view was echoed by 
the director of the Institute of Fiscal Studies, particularly given his concern that there could be ‘millions 
of winners and losers’ in the transition process (Johnson, 2018).  
 
UC is, in many ways, the most visible testament to the disintegration of current welfare programmes, 
particularly in-work support. This is all the more concerning given that the promise to ‘make work 
pay’, using effective in-work social security schemes, has been central to every government’s election 
commitments since 1997, including all Conservative and Conservative-led governments since 2010. 
Gordon Brown’s critique went on to make the connection between the rise in child poverty and the 
flaws in UC, pointing out that two-thirds of those children have a parent in work, but who were earning 
too little to be able to lift them out of poverty. In many ways this simply highlights one of the features 
of in-work means-tested support, which is the low levels at which the benefit is paid and the ease with 
which low-paid recipients can slip in and out of relative poverty levels. In fact, the inability of in-work 
benefits systems’ inability to ensure that working claimants remain above the ‘poverty zone’, instead 
of at or near subsistence-level earnings, has been a feature of low pay and means-tested in-work 
support almost since its inception. Among the key issues highlighted by a study in 2010 conducted for 
the DWP was that over half of those coming out of the official definition of relative poverty by moving 
above the 60% median income level - helped by Working Tax Credit wage supplements - only just 
managed to edge their way into the next leve l (the ‘60-70% bracket’) (Browne and Paull, 2010). The 
flip side to this was it did not take very much in terms of an income fall - perhaps a small cut in hours 
or cut in overtime opportunities - to prompt an early return to ‘poverty' (Browne and Paull, 2010).  
Unsurprisingly, the Coalition government, in the face of such evidence, was keen in 2010 to try to 
move to a reformed system that could address such problems (Puttick, 2012b). Given the increasing 
likelihood of workers being in variable hours (and therefore variable pay) jobs – something facilitated 




is likely to continue facing such challenges unless more radical solutions can be found on the ‘work’ 
side of the work-welfare interface. In particular, measures are needed to take workers completely out 
of subsistence or below-subsistence wage levels and avoid the need to rely on State benefits. 
The National Roll-Out. The scale of UC’s continuing national roll-out from 2019 onwards is enormous. 
Seven million households and a sizeable cohort of ‘self -employed’ are affected. For the first time, 
people in work face the prospect of losing money, or having their benefits stopped altogether, if they 
cannot demonstrate to their Jobcentre that they are searching for better paid work and taking up 
employment opportunities that will reduce their take-up of State support. This can be the case even 
when the new (or additional) employment may not fit in with their family and other commitments - 
or is conspicuously less advantageous in terms of factors like travel and other costs and on-costs. For 
that reason, the Commons Public Accounts Committee in one of its key recommendations said it was 
seriously concerned about the DWP’s ability to transfer an estimated 4 million people from existing 
‘legacy’ benefits like Working Tax Credit to Universal Credit without causing significant hardship (PAC, 
2018).  
 
The Unite campaign against UC has been drawing attention to these and other highly negative 
features, some of which are currently shared with other benefits. Others are UC-specific. The system 
has certainly led to growing opposition given the plethora of problems it has generated (Unite, 2018).
4  
These include delays in processing claims, with claimants experiencing long waits before they receive 
money - a point borne out by the National Audit Office’s report, observing that one in five UC claimants 
experience delays in getting the full amount of benefit to which they are entitled. The reliance on on-
line claims puts a lot of people at a disadvantage, increasing the risk of delay s still further. 
Furthermore, a system aimed at reducing the stigma associated with benefits has actually been made 
worse. The system’s sheer inefficiency, and inability to deliver support in a timely way, also has 
practical consequences. For example, landlords are now less willing to rent properties to UC claimants 
given that, with some exceptions, rent support is paid to tenants as part of their UC rather than, as 
before, directly to landlords. That, in turn, has meant some agencies and letting agents refusing to 
deal with those on UC. To some extent this is just an extension of an existing problem faced by Housing 
Benefit claimants who experience discrimination by letting agencies. The government has made some 
modifications to this, for example by enabling payments to be made to landlords if this is in the 
tenant's interest, or as part of a discretionary alternative payment arrangement (and in cases where 
there has been a build-up of arrears of at least two months, and the landlord has requested a change 
which the DWP accepts). Otherwise, the issue remains highly problematic, particularly for low -paid 
workers who may already have serious debt problems. 
Payment Intervals. Once payments are made there is now, in most cases, a lengthy gap of four weeks 
between payments. In terms of household budgeting that can be highly problematic for those who 
are weekly paid, and used to budgeting on the basis of payments coming in to the household each 
week. Recognising this, and the need to give people alternatives, Northern Ireland and Scotland have 
given UC recipients the option of being paid twice monthly. 
At a Welfare Reform Summit in April 2018 at Staffordshire University welfare advisers, union 
delegates, and academics shared information about UC and debated a range of problems affecting 




from legacy benefits. There is considerable concern about the challenges posed for claimants having 
to navigate DWP on-line systems and information, often having to make decisions with little or no 
specialist advice to hand. Despite government assurances to the contrary there is little evidence that 
the DWP’s ‘Universal Support’ initiative has been working. There was also a concern about the UC 
conditionality and sanctioning regime. It was clear from the evidence of participants that the sanctions 
typically being imposed can be considerably longer than those applied with other benefits like JSA and 
Employment and Support Allowance. This has a propensity to impact particularly hard on groups with 
disability or housing problems. It was suggested that this has been making a sanction ‘almost 
inevitable’ for some groups of more vulnerable system users. In practice, failures are often due to 
claimants struggling to understand some of the scheme’s intricacies.  
 
Sanctions, when imposed, are contributing to rising household debt; and in many respects they are 
also operating unfairly. Nor do they seem to have any purpose to them, especially if those affected 
still do not get the support they may need: a conclusion which is also reflected in research by a number 





UC Payments. The fact that UC may only paid to one member of the household, unless alternative 
payment arrangements can be agreed with the DWP, is also proving to be problematic – especially 
when there are disputes between couples over finances. In practice couples might only receive a single 
joint payment paid into a single account which is the claimant’s or partner’s name; or paid into a joint 
account into both names, but which in practice can be drawn upon by either account holder in an 
unrestricted way. DWP guidance includes points about the advantages and disadvantages of having 
UC payment made into a joint account, with examples of ‘when a joint account might not be a good 
idea’ (notably when ‘one of you has a problem with over-spending and finds it difficult to stick with a 
budget’ or a partner has a poor credit history): issues considered in the DWP’s guide Should you 
manage your money jointly or separately?  The scope for problems and disputes, and even domestic 
violence in its different forms, has certainly increased: a problem exacerbated as the levels of support 
provided by UC have reduced. Women’s Aid has pointed out that financial problems, including a lack 
of resources during the monthly periods when couples have to budget carefully and run out of money, 
can be a potent source of violence in some households. Katie Ghose, Chief Executive of Women’s Aid 
has explained the design of UC did not have survivors of domestic abuse in mind; and abusers certainly 
have opportunities to exploit the single household payments system (Women’s Aid, 2018). Besides 
such problems, the system is clearly not delivering support at the levels required. This much is obvious 




Despite its many problems and design faults, the Office of Budget Responsibility has said that it would 
be hugely expensive to abandon the project now that roll-out is so far advanced (OBR, 2018b). The 
Social Security Advisory Committee has said that the system is now set to be the ‘dominant landmark 
on the benefit skyline for many years to come’, albeit with many challenges, including the problem 
that the scheme’s roll-out is coinciding with a ‘dramatic growth in part-time and more flexible patterns 





The system is clearly broken. The only question is whether an incoming government committed to 
reforming this key area of the Welfare State should maintain the UC system, but with some radical 
restructuring, or abandon it altogether and start again. 
 
UC: Scheme Specifics  
The UC scheme follows a similar model to earlier means-tested benefits, including processes by which 
awards are assessed on means. Basically, a comparison is made between ‘needs’, ie what the State 
says a person can live on week-to-week (or in UC’s case month-to-month), and the income resources 
and other notional resources which that person is treated as having. In the case of an employed 
claimant their main income resource will be ‘earnings’ and other benefits which are not specifically 
‘disregarded’ (for example awards of Personal Independence Payment, which are ring-fenced). Their 
needs are gauged by reference to their UC ‘maximum amount’. This is made up of eligible allowances 
and elements. UC payments make up the difference between that maximum amount and the person's 
total income resources. 
 
Having made the needs-resources comparison, awards are made. Payments are generally paid 
monthly in one sum, which can be problematic for recipients who may be used to receiving wages and 
benefits more frequently. Nevertheless, those designing UC decided that UC payments should be part 
of an approach that ‘mimicked’ the world of work and monthly-paid salary (DWP, 2011; Puttick, 
2012b: 239)
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. The idea was also to encourage recipients to budget carefully and manage their money 
better, including payments of rent. As already noted, under the UC system this generally has to be 
done by recipients from their awards, rather than through direct payments of rent to landlords (as 
was done with previous housing costs schemes like Housing Benefit).  
 
In the face of evidence of rising debt and arrears of unpaid rent, the government has made some 
modifications: for example by enabling payments to be made to landlords, exceptionally, if this is in 
the tenant's interest - or as part of a discretionary alternative payment arrangement (and in cases 
where there has been a build-up of arrears of at least two months, and the landlord has requested a 
change which the DWP accepts).  
 
Otherwise, the issue remains highly problematic, particularly for low-paid workers who may already 
have serious debt problems. 
 
What follows is an outline of how steps in the UC assessment process work – something that will 
highlight the difficulties claimants can face. 
  
Assessing the Award 
The assessment process involves five ‘steps’ culminating in a UC award at Step 5 based  on a 








This requires the following allowances and elements, for which the claimant may be eligible, to be 
identified and aggregated:  
 
• Standard Allowance (Couple or Single Claimant), with an additional amount for an ill or 
disabled claimant or partner  
• Child Element for up to 2 children, with extra amounts for disabled children (paid at lower or 
higher monthly amounts): controversially now capped at two (Machin, 2017)  
• Limited Capability for Work Element (this was abolished for new claims made on or after 3
rd 
April 2017, but some claimants may still be receiving this, subject to transitional rights and 
exceptions; or a Limited Capability for Work-Related Activity Element for those incapacitated 
and unable to work 
• Carer Element if ‘regular and substantial’ caring responsibilities are undertaken for a severely 
disabled person   
• Childcare Costs Element for those in paid work who are paying for formal childcare  
• Housing Costs Element for rent or service charges 
 
Housing Costs Restrictions. The housing costs element has been restricted in two ways:  
 
- If there is one more bedroom than allowed the housing costs element is cut by 14% of the 




April 2018 support for mortgage costs or repair loans ended: instead the DWP may 




Step 2  
 
Earned Income  
 
Net earnings from employment are used, ie a net figure after tax, National Insurance, and 
contributions to an occupational pension scheme. NB Employers are responsible for providing 
workers’ real time information to HMRC, and the self-employed must report their own earnings 
monthly. The self-employed can be deemed to have higher earnings than they, in fact, have as part of 
the Minimum Income Floor rules in the UC Regulations.  
 
Work Allowance. If the claimant is entitled to a work allowance the earnings are compared to the 
work allowance; and if they are less than the allowance all earnings are disregarded as income. If the 
earnings exceed the work allowance, then a 63% taper is applied to the excess to produce the amount 





If there is no eligibility for an allowance, then all earnings are included in the UC calculation. Currently, 
there is only a work allowance available if claimants are responsible for a child or have limited 
capability for work; and the amount varies depending on whether the UC claim includes a housing 
costs element.  
At 2019/20 rates the amounts are:  
 
• Lower work allowance (one or more dependent children or limited capability to work): £287  
• Higher work allowance (no housing amount, and one or more dependent children or limited 
capability to work): £503  
 
April 2019 Rises. From April 2019 the government will increase the level of work allowances for 
families with children and those with a disability who have limited capability for work. Details will be 
known later in 2019: but it is estimated that this could assist claimants who rent, and have a housing 
costs element, by up to £630 a year. The change is less advantageous to those without a housing costs 
element, and the changes will do nothing for other groups excluded in 2015.  
Overall the changes fall well short of reversing all the cuts to the system made since 2015 (Tucker, 
2018).    
 
UC, Earned Income, and Trade Disputes. In the case of employed UC recipients who have withdrawn 
their labour in furtherance of a trade dispute, they are to be 'assumed to have employed earnings at 
the same level they would have had were it not for the trade dispute.' (UC Regulations 2013, reg. 56). 
The practical impact is to ascribe a fictitiously high level of earned income at Step 2 to such claimants, 
so that when their wages are stopped (or reduced) by the employer during the dispute there will be 
no rise in their UC. Normally when earnings or other income goes down, UC is recalculated, and i t goes 
up to reflect the claimant’s and dependants’ rising needs.  
 
As the TUC rightly predicted during consultations with the Social Security Advisory Committee in 2012, 
the change imposes considerable hardship on claimants' families during disputes.  
 
Plainly the change has made the State even less 'neutral' during industrial disputes than i t was 
(supposedly) before the change.      
 
Step 3  
 
Other Income  
 
This includes most other forms of earned or unearned income, but with some ‘disregards’. Unlike 
earned income this will count in full, pound for pound, in the calculation. ‘Tariff’ income must also be 
taken into account, including £4.35 per month for every slice of £250, or part of it, above £6000.  
 
Capital above £16,000 including realisable capital assets that are not specifically ‘disregarded’ in the 





Step 4  
 
Total Income  
 
Net earnings and income at Steps 2 and 3 are aggregated to produce an overall income figure .  
 
Step 5  
 
Calculate UC  
 
To get the final amount payable the income identified at Step 4 is deducted from the maximum 
amount at Step 1.  
 
Claimants migrating from means-tested benefits like WTC to UC are entitled to transitional protection, 
ie through payments which are needed to maintain their previous level of support Given that support 
for some groups is likely to be smaller than the amounts received under legacy benefits this is an 
important aspect of the transition process accompanying the national roll-out. 
 
UC Re-Assessment  
 
Once an award has been processed and is up and running, which may take anything up to five weeks 
(and in practice may be longer), it is then subject to change after a re-calculation. The essential feature 
of previous means-tested benefits schemes has been maintained, which is that as earnings or other 
income (including ‘notional income’) rise the UC award goes down, and if it reduces the award will 
generally go up: a kind of see-saw effect. For workers with variable hours (or no set hours, as with zero 
hours, on-call contracts, and other ‘flexible working’ variants) , the experience can be extremely 
difficult. Indeed, can be more like a roller coaster ride, with considerable scope for errors, delays, and 
overpayments or under-payments (Puttick, 2018).  
 
The overall effect can be to leave low-paid workers on benefits like WTC or UC little better off after 
events like a pay rise or winning an equal pay claim, although the precise impact will depend on factors 
like the extent to which benefit income is withdrawn. That, in turn, depends on the recipient’s 
eligibility for a work allowance to mitigate the impact of the rise, and the operation of the taper, when 
the UC award is recalculated. 
 
The problem can be seen if a WTC or UC claimant has had a successful equal pay claim. The resulting 
pay rise will lead to a recalculation of the claimant’s benefits, with a higher net wage informing a re -
assessment of the UC. A rise in earnings on the work side of their income sources will generate a 
reduction on the welfare side, producing a largely Pyrrhic victory (Puttick, 2018:). Worse effects can 
sometimes follow. If a settlement is reached on the equal pay claim, and a capital sum is paid, the 








Budget 2015: UC Cuts  
 
As a result of cuts made in the Budget 2015, the value of in-work benefits to working UC claimants 
eroded massively. On top of a four-year freeze on up-ratings to UC rates which is set to continue for a 
further year after April 2019, work allowances have been removed for any workers or couples not 
responsible for children, or who do not have limited capability for work (a category which has in any 
case been removed, subject to exceptions and transitional arrangements). The value of the work 
allowances which are still available has been cut back, and although there is the prospect of rises from 
April 2019 (as noted in the section 'Assessing the Award', above) the  increases fall well short of what 
is needed. As has been pointed out by CPAG in their commentary, given that £37bn is being cut from 
social security each year, and that around £3bn was taken in the work allowance cuts alone, the 
government’s decision to put just £1.7bn a year back into UC is hardly generous (Tucker, 2019).  
 
The overall effect of cuts to the social security budget has been to reduce the income of workers and 
families, and immediately increase the dependency of low wage workers and their families on sho rt-
term loans, food banks, and alternative sources. The conclusion of the Institute for Fiscal Studies in its 
IFS Green Budget 2016 was that the changes had ‘significantly cut’ the amount of support that UC 
could give to low-income working families, and it also affected ‘progression’ opportunities (IFS, 2016: 
ch. 10). Other concerns have been directed at the taper rate which at 63% is still seen as inordinately 
high. It is set to continue at that level without any sign of changes in the immediate future. In the view 
of the Resolution Foundation the failure to lower it and take it back towards the level that was 
originally intended (40%), has not just helped to impoverish low-paid workers. It has also worsened 
progression incentives. In the aftermath of the 2015 changes it was estimated that by 2020 a worker 
with a work allowance would reach that allowance and start to be hit by the taper after working just 
five hours a week at the NLW rate (and ten hours if they have the higher rate of someone with a 
housing costs element in their UC maximum amount) (Finch, 2016: 21). Since then the government 
has been promising easements - but it remains to be seen what the impact of these will be, once they 
are made.  
 
Housing Costs & Rent Controls  
 
Besides the impact of cuts to in-work support in the form of the wage supplements provided through 
UC, there are also wider problems that have affected in-work support, notably in the housing market. 
As a result of the abolition by the Housing Act 1980 of rent controls in the private rental sector of the 
housing market landlords have been largely unhindered in their ability to raise rents for the last four 
decades: a problem made worse by the sell-off of council homes and a shortage of affordable housing. 
These policies also served to push up rents and house prices. Aggravated by low wage growth, 
escalating living costs, and the pace of rent rises outpacing wage rises, the number of workers and 
their families forced to rely on Housing Benefit (or the housing costs element paid with UC) has risen 
dramatically (JRF, 2018). The scale of the problem can be gauged from an analysis in 2018 of rents and 
pay across English districts. This shows that rent levels are more than a third of full -time local pay in 
over half of those districts when the least expensive quarter of private rents is compared to the 
earnings of the lowest paid quarter of employees. Using the same rent-wages comparison, rent is 




More affordable areas are located, primarily, in the North – but even there - as the study highlights - 
there are also parts of Greater Manchester and North Yorkshire where rent levels exceed a third of 
full-time pay (JRF, 2018).  
 
The scale of the crisis in this area of the welfare system cannot be overstated. Housing Benefit 
currently comes with a hefty price tag. At over £27 billion a year it is one of the biggest and fastest-
growing parts of the welfare bill – in fact more than the combined cost of the police, roads and 
defence. That amount continues to increase as the numbers of tenants, and rent levels rise. As, Paul 
Johnson, Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, has said on these points, the problem is not just 
with the HB system itself: it is with ‘the whole of housing policy…We urgently need to build more 
houses, public and private. But we also need a radical overhaul of the way we tax housing and 
approach housing policy more generally.’(IFS/Johnson, 2015).  
Despite such calls, the government’s main response has been, mainly, to focus on making the eligibility 
criteria for HB support tougher and reducing the value of support. As well as benefit caps, and 
measures like the Bedroom Tax limit (now operating within the UC housing costs eleme nt, as discussed 
above), the system has become increasingly restrictive in what it can provide, whether this is through 
UC or HB (as the main benefit still supporting most working claimants on Working Tax Credit).
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State support for housing is an important component in the overall subsidy for workers, defraying 
costs which would otherwise have to be met from a low wage. For that reason, the relentless rise in 
rent levels begs the question whether it is now time to revert to some kind of rent controls - perhaps 
drawing on some of the models offered in other countries like Ireland, Germany and the USA where 
schemes to either control rents (setting limits on how much may be charged) or introduce stability 
measures (whereby limits are set on how much rents may be raised over specified periods) 
(Economist, 2015) appear to operate successfully. Without this there will come a time when the only 
other alternative will be to start restricting the amount of rent subsidy that is provided or withdraw 
support altogether. The government has already ended support for home owners through the 
abolition of mortgage interest costs relief (Morgan, 2018).  
As with regulation of the wages floor, State support for the housing costs of low-paid workers is an 
area of the welfare system which the government may have little choice but to start regulating again, 
and soon.  
 
The Duty to Work, Mandatory ‘Progression’ and the ‘3 Way Relationship’  
Expectations that benefits claimants should take steps to find paid work have been a feature of a ‘duty 
to work’ for some while (Deakin and Wilkinson: 110-199). By the 1970s, however, that duty had 
intensified incrementally, extending to a duty to maintain work and not leave employment and claim 
out-of-work benefits: an expectation reinforced by benefits sanctioning for infringing the ‘industrial 
misconduct’ rule – invoked, typically, after a dismissal for misconduct; and the ‘voluntarily leaving’ 
rule. Since then sanctioning is not just deployed against those voluntarily relinquishing paid work, and 
then claiming benefits. Under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 it can penalise, at the highest level of 
sanctioning in terms of amounts and duration, those who choose to reduce their pay ‘for no good 




With the introduction of UC has come the most wide-ranging extension and contentious extension of 
that duty, namely a duty to seek further work directed at employed UC claimants under the In-Work 
Progression scheme (IWP). The policy intention is ‘incentivise’ workers to raise their earnings until 
they reach a ‘Conditionality Earnings Threshold’ (CET). The measure is, again, reinforced by possible 
sanctioning for non-compliance with their Claimant Commitment. The CET is generally set at a level 
which aligns to a 35-hour working week paid at National Living Wage (NLW).  
Self-employed labour market participants with low earnings are eligible for UC, but they are also 
subject to measures to incentivise them to raise those earnings. However, this is done in a ve ry 
different way, under the ‘minimum income floor’ (MIF) provisions of the UC Regulations (regs.62-64). 
These presume that self-employed UC claimants are earning at the level of their ‘individual threshold’- 
essentially an earnings target that is comparable to the CET set for the employed. Their level of support 
only rises if their earnings increase. The system leaves self-employed UC claimants much worse off 
than employed claimants, as research by the Social Market Foundation has found (Social Market 
Foundation, 2016). This has concluded that about a fifth of families with a person in self-employment 
already being supported by tax credits and housing benefit have been migrating to UC. Just under 40% 
of that group are estimated to be earning below the MIF income ‘floor’. 
Besides the controversies around the introduction of this novel extension of conditionality and 
sanctioning there are other controversial aspects to IWP. In particular, the closer working between 
DWP Work Coaches and employers as part of the process achieved considerable publicity (and 
notoriety) when the (then) Employment Minister, Pritti Patel MP, in her evidence to the Commons 
Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into mandatory progression (Work and Pensions Committee, 
2016: 41), referred to the ‘three-way relationship’ between employers, DWP work coaches, and 
workers and the scope for the coaches to pick up the phone and say to the employer ‘This claimant 
has only been working X hours right now. He or she now feels they are ready to work more hours or 
develop or be supported into a new role’. There are a number of scenarios in which a worker could 
come under pressure from an employer to take on additional work. In some cases the employer may 
be entitled to do this under the contract, and may well be able to take disciplinary action if staff refuse. 
Typically, this may be where workers can be expected to cover additional shifts or periods of ‘cover’ 
for colleagues on sick leave, and as a result of requirements under the contract to work flexibly. On 
the other hand, the employer may not have such power. With the roll-out of IWP, and the pressure 
on Work Coaches to achieve results in ‘progressing’ staff to additional work, there will be increasing 
pressure on employed UC claimants from the DWP to take up such opportunities.  
Despite the IWP legal regime being in place for some while it is far from clear what limits there are on 
the DWP’s powers in Social Security Law - especially as clearer guidance on this which the Work and 
Pensions Committee requested in 2016 (Work and Pensions Committee, 2016: para. 59) has still not 
been forthcoming. 
For organisations like the Child Poverty Action Group and Gingerbread (an organisation representing 
single parents) the need for a fair balance between work commitment and family responsibilities in 
this area has never been more obvious. For example, CPAG’s view is that the IWP system should not 
operate in a way that requires workers to give up ‘predictable shifts that fit in with family life’ , or be 
expected to upset existing childcare arrangements; and the protection of the needs of workers’ 




DWP decision-makers’ discretion and administrative guidance (CPAG Submission IWO0023 to the 
Committee’s Inquiry). 
Gingerbread’s view is that workers with parental responsibilities should not have to immediately 
accede to Work Coaches’ requests to take on new work or change their existing patterns of work. 
Furthermore, they should be entitled to hold out for jobs which, as well as matching their skills and 
experience, are ‘sustainable’ and can lead to improved working conditions - rather than simply 
complying with the government’s ‘work first’ approach under which the first priority is to increase 
hours and pay, irrespective of their family’s rights and needs (Gingerbread Submission IWO0026 to 
the Committee’s Inquiry). In another area of the system, the DWP’s expectation that UC recipients 
with responsibilities for young children should take up work opportunities which will get them to a 16-
hours a week threshold to avoid the imposition of the ‘benefits cap’ (which  penalises them financially) 
raises the question whether ECHR Convention rights are engaged, and if the DWP is acting lawfully. In 
principle they are not, given the combined effects of ECHR Article 8 on family life and the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 Article 3(1) . This requires that ‘in all actions 
concerning children…the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. A test case on 
the point came before the Supreme Court in July 2018. The seven judges in the case were still due to 






To say that the current in-work welfare system is in crisis is a massive understatement. In-work means 
tested benefits schemes, including parts of the system dealing with key areas like housing and 
childcare costs, are beset by problems, many of which are due to austerity and cuts.  
 
The most pressing concern, however, relates to the Universal Credit system. The scheme in its present 
state – pending either radical reform or replacement – is highly dysfunctional as a result of flawed 
design features, adjudication problems and the failure of the gove rnment’s promised ‘Universal 






















































CHAPTER SEVEN  
Welfare Futures & Conclusions  
Scarcely a week goes by without evidence of the damage done by cuts to benefits and services, the 
impact of poorly managed reforms and schemes, and the rise in in-work poverty. In the face of such 
evidence there is a clear need to reverse the decline and stop further disintegration. Beyond that, 
renewal and a new generation of policies are needed if the welfare system is to be fit for purpose.  
An essential component in any effective floor of social protection is work, with systems in place to 
secure that it can deliver fair wages and otherwise meets Decent Work and established international 
standards (ILO, 2011). In the UK’s case there are some significant shortcomings on the ‘work’ side of 
the work-welfare interface, not least as a result of weak collective bargaining and a lack of effective 
redistributive mechanisms. This, in turn, has produced a higher than necessary  reliance on State 
support in the form of wage subsidisation through the social security system. Rather than diminishing, 
though, this is set to grow exponentially, fuelled by the ‘dramatic growth’ in part-time and more 
flexible patterns of working (SSAC, 2017). Schemes like Universal Credit, which have been specifically 
designed to support low hours, low paid work, marks a new low in the growth in wage subsidisation. 
As this paper has discussed, much of that dependency is the legacy of neo-liberal, deregulatory policies 
that began in the 1980s with the assault on collective bargaining and the abolition of the wages 
councils and other redistributive mechanisms producing a weakened wages floor. This has also been 
instrumental in undermining the contributions-based social insurance system and the contributory 
principle (Bell and Gaffney, 2012) which, together with collective bargaining, has in the past played an 
essential role in maintaining labour standards.  
New approaches to establishing and maintaining an effective floor of protection and restoring this key 
area of the Welfare State will require new approaches. The Bain Report provided an important analysis 
of the shortcomings of the minimum wage ‘single rate’, and its inability to do much more than provide 
a one size fits all regime (Bain Commission, 2014). This is clearly a major limitation, particularly in 
sectors where employers can afford to be paying above NMW/NLW rates, and where there is little 
pressure on employers to do so. The scheme also does nothing to assist career and wage progression, 
for example by requiring employers to put in place grade scales, or otherwise provide opportunities 
to take on better-paid work, assisted by investment in training. The former wages councils could do 
that, and there is still a basic model for such grade progression provided by the Agricultural Wages 
Board, notably in the grade rates and categories in the Agricultural Wages (Wales) Order 2018 (which 
also secures key matters like overtime and sick pay, training and leave entitlements, and so forth).  
 
The scheme for collective bargaining in the IER’s Manifesto for Labour Law, if implemented, would 
enable such necessary elements to be brought back into many workplaces where they have been 
missing – but also deliver much more besides. It offers a valuable blue-print for improving pay at 
workplace, enterprise, and sectoral levels, and securing minimum entitlements across a wide range of 
workplace issues including working hours, holidays, pensions, and equal opportunities. In doing so it 
would certainly diminish the need for the ‘vast array of legislation’ that currently regulates work and 
requires workers to litigate to obtain entitlements (IER, 2018: 13). It also has the potential for reducing 
the current heavy reliance on the State to prop up low wages and poor conditions as these affect 




Equalities and equal opportunities are a particularly important feature in the Manifesto, not least 
given the current issues around women’s pay and progression (Costas Dias and Elming, 2016; 
Lyonette, 2015). It is also important for groups like disabled workers, given the scale of the disability 
pay gap. According to research published by the TUC ahead of the TUC Disabled Workers Conference 
in 2018 that gap now stands at 15%: a difference that brings into question the effectiveness of current 
equalities legislation (TUC, 2018). A big concern is with the statistic that, despite increases in the 
number of disabled people now employed, the unemployment rate for disabled people is still 50 per 
cent higher than for non-disabled people.  
Implementation of a system of collective bargaining which can, in time, raise the wages floor would 
have other important spin-offs, not least in helping to reverse the rise in in-work claims for Housing 
Benefit (and the UC housing costs element). Low wages and the pace of rent rises which have been 
outpacing wage rises means that the number of workers forced to rely on Housing Benefit (or the 
housing costs element paid with UC) has risen dramatically (JRF, 2018). This has been made worse by 
an inadequate supply of affordable housing (IFS/Johnson, 2015). The scale of the problem was 
highlighted by JRF studies in 2018 of rent and pay across English districts. This highlighted how rent 
levels are now often more than a third of full -time local pay in over half of those districts surveyed 
(when the least expensive quarter of private rents was compared with the earnings of the lowest-paid 
quarter of employees). Using the same rent-wages comparison, rent levels in parts of Greater London 
and the South-East were even higher: half of local full-time pay in some areas of Greater London, 
Manchester, and Yorkshire. This begs the question whether it is now time to revert to some kind of 
rent controls, drawing on the experience of rent controls or rent stabilisation measures of the kind 
operating in countries like Germany, Ireland, and the USA, but factoring in the some of the risks this 
may pose to the supply of housing if any new measures are not managed effectively.  
 
There are other significant areas of ‘renewal’ which any incoming government with p rogressive 
policies will need to consider. These include the need to go much further with support for childcare, 
indeed moving to a reliable scheme of universal childcare – a priority put forward six years ago by the 
TUC’s General Secretary, Frances O’Grady, calling it one of the ‘new pillars of the Welfare State’ 
(O’Grady, 2012). Without this, it is unlikely that progress can be made in enabling many women, and 
particularly those with young children, to join the labour market, and progressing on equal terms with 
men. As TUC research has found, many women are effectively ‘locked out’ of employment. This is 
reflected in participation rates: 64% of women of mothers with children under the age of five are in 
paid employment compared to 93% of men. Women’s ability to stay in work is also clearly affected by 
regional differences in the availability of childcare, as well as wider factors such as transport, housing 
costs, and the quality of employment (‘Pay and Parenthood’, TUC/IPPR, September 2016).  Threats to 
key provision like maintained nurseries are also under threat from insecure funding from central 
government (LGA, 2019b).   
 
In another key area of equalities, social security for workers from abroad, access to support already 
depends on complex 'residence' requirements and barriers (Ryan, 2005). EU workers and their family 
members (including non-EU nationals) currently have a right to work in the UK, but also a right of 
'equal treatment' on social security matters under Directive 2004/38 on free movement, the 
Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016, and Regulation 883/2004 on Social Security Co-ordination. Post-




from legislation like the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination Bill 2019 that this will come 
under the control of ministers under delegated powers, subject to new arrangements made with the 
EU. Given the past history of calls for tougher restrictions on 'welfare tourism', and an increasingly 
hostile environment for migrant workers in the past, it is not difficult to anticipate major challenges 
ahead in this area of the social security regime. Indeed, it is not so long ago that the government was 
calling for tougher restrictions on EU workers' access to in-work benefits: something that would be 
part of a new regime of 'economic integration', with similar proposals coming from two other major 
parties including the Opposition. If this had been implemented, it would have quickly led to a labour 
market of 'two teams': Team A, made of UK nationals and workers with settled status, enjoying full 
access to in-work support; and Team B, made up up of EU and non-EU workers, receiving significantly 
less favourable treatment in terms of such access (Puttick, 2015).    
Going forward, there will also need to be a renewed focus on the increasing challenges to work itself 
resulting from the rapid transformations being brought about by new technology and automation. 
This raises the question whether a basic income for all citizens might in the future deliver a better, 
more secure source of support than the current social security system. At present, the scope for 
automation and artificial intelligence systems (AI) to displace jobs - especially unskilled and semi-
skilled work – has prompted questions about how this trend will impact on levels of pay; and how the 
State will need to deliver support in sectors of the labour market where opportunities for new 
employment support are reducing, and under-employment is growing. Much of the concern links to 
issues like the potential impact of minimum wage interventions as employers make decisions on 
investment in automation and consider trade-offs between new jobs or automation when this is 
available (Eliot, 2018). Much of the wider debate, though, is also around the desirability in the future 
of phasing out the social security system, in time, and replacing it with a ‘basic income’. According to 
a Royal Society of Arts study this is a system capable of delivering a regular, unconditional payment to 
every adult and child which would not be means-tested and withdrawn as earnings rise. One of the 
arguments put forward by proponents is that the system would eliminate most of the complexity 
associated with the current means-tested system, as well as tackle the challenges of both in-work and 
out-of-work poverty more effectively (Painter and Thoung/RSA, 2015: 8-41).  
The Shadow Chancellor, John McDonnell MP, has said that Labour intends to include a plan for 
universal basic income in its next General Election manifesto. But there are still a lot of issues for 
consideration, and it remains to be seen what comes out of pre-election policy discussions. Among 
other things it will need to address one of the main arguments against it, which is that the social 
security system is better-placed to deliver targeted support that can meet the specific needs of groups 
like workers and their families. Furthermore, the debate needs to factor in the views of those who see 
a restoration (or partial restoration) of the contributory principle as a preferred way forward for 
meeting new contingencies, and which would help to re-build trust in social security system and 
reduce the stigmatisation of welfare take-up. The chances of this are better, so the argument goes, if 
‘insurance’ principles are restored. One of the attractions of the contributory principle is that it does, 
indeed, define the welfare system in terms of an insurance policy. The focus is on a relationship 
between what people put in and take out. That principle has been damaged by a number of factors, 
including the rising cost of NI contributions in recent years, and the poor ‘return’ often seen from 
contribution-based benefits (as discussed in chapter 2): what has been described as the ‘nothing for 




There is certainly considerable mileage in revisiting the advantages of contribution-based models. 
There is evidence, for example, that countries with the strongest ‘contributory’ components in their 
schemes produce the best wage replacement rates, coupled with better public attitudes towards the 
idea of State ‘welfare’ (O’Leary/Demos, 2018). There are also attractions in the idea of rebuilding 
support for social insurance around a new generation of benefits which could deliver innovative and 
popular schemes and enable people to make provision for career breaks, planned leave periods, and 
extended parental leave. There is scope, too, for modifying the insurance-based part of the social 
security system to help in addressing one of the core design weaknesses of Universal Credit: this is 
that it incentivises the creation low hours mini-jobs paid at earnings below the Lower Earnings Limit 
(LEL) for NI contributions. This does not just distort the labour market by exempting employers from 
NI contributions and taking employees out of the scope of social protection afforded by contributory 
and non-contributory benefits: it does so at a considerable cost to the Treasury. This is an aspect of 
the UC scheme that needs to be restructured, with a view to ensuring that there can be opportunities 
in the future for workers on low hours to be in the contributory system and gain a stake in its 
entitlements. The point was made by Kate Bell and Declan Gaffney when they argued that the system 
should be modified to enable ‘crediting in’ on a partial basis of those earning below the LEL. This would 
extend coverage at the same time as off-setting current incentives for employers to offer low hours, 
low paid work that takes workers out of support from contributory benefits. Interestingly, the 
introduction of partial contributions in respect of mini jobs, but at lower rates than for other jobs, was 
adopted in Germany when the Harz IV reforms were developed (Bell and Gaffney, 2012: 6, 34, 35).  
Apart from the unwelcome baggage that reliance on wage subsidisation through means-tested 
schemes like UC and HB involves – as well as increased conditionality, sanctioning and the other 
negative aspects associated with means-testing - uncertainty about the rising fiscal costs of UC is a 
major concern as the scheme is rolled out (OBR, 2018b). In the bigger picture this raises broader 
questions about the how the Welfare State, and particularly expensive aspects like in-work support, 
is going to be paid for in the future. According to a Resolution Foundation study To Maintain Our 
Welfare State We Need to Rethink How We Pay for It, OBR projections that maintain State provision 
at current levels will require spending as a share of GDP increasing by 7 per cent by 2066 need a 
response, and soon. Without action to address this, debt could rise by as much as 230 per cent of GDP 
- the equivalent of raising total tax revenues by £160bn a year. This is achievable, but if accomplished 
through rises in higher income and consumption taxes on the working age population, it would have 
clear impacts on living standards. An alternative scenario – no doubt favoured by the Right - would be 
to implement major cuts to the Welfare State. 
A further approach would be to start identifying sources that are currently outside the tax net, or 
under-taxed. The biggest candidate for this would be ‘wealth’  in corporate and other forms. Concerted 
action against tax avoidance and evasion is also long over-due. Wealth taxes per se, though, are 
unlikely to be easy, as the Foundation suggests. Yet, given that the only other two realistic alternatives 
are ‘stripping back our Welfare State or very large tax rises on working people’ (Bell, 2018) , there may 
be little choice but to go down this route if current levels of welfare support are to be sustained, and 
improved upon.  
There are precedents for this. In 1997, taxing the excess profits of the utilities privatised by the 




order to help fund welfare-to-work and tax credit schemes - it was recognised as an entirely legitimate 


































































Chapter 1 – Introduction & Overview  
1. The term ‘Welfare State’ has never been comprehensively explained, let alone formally 
defined, but the description ‘A collection of services … whose boundaries expand and contract 
over time’ (Timmins, 2001: 7) seems particularly apt at a time when the coverage provided by 
welfare schemes and services ebbs and flows in the face of financial, political, and other 
pressures. Austerity measures and cuts have ensured that it in recent years it has been mostly 
‘ebb’. The International Labour Organisation has laid down what the minimum standards for 
an effective Social Security programme should be in terms of benefits, allowances, etc for 
dealing with particularly contingencies, namely the ILO (1952) Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention 1952, International Labour Organisation No. 102. Since then the ILO 
has produced a more comprehensive, up-to-date blueprint for national ‘social protection 
floors’ (Bachelet Report, 2011).  
 
2. The social wage describes that part of the support they receive, whether in the form of 
income, services, or other assistance that derives from the State and its agencies, or wider 
community. The concept is used more formally in other countries, even to the point of social 
rights embedded in the constitution. In South Africa, the ‘social wage packet’ is at the heart 
of the Social Security Agency’s legal remit to provide ‘comprehensive social security services’.  
 
 
3. Lord Woolf, a former Law Lord and head of the Court of Appeal, described Community Care 
as the ‘residual social security benefit’ which had ‘completed the Social Security system 
established following the Beveridge Report’ (R v Westminster City Council, ex parte M, P, A, X 
(1998) HLR 10 at 16). Entitlements are important for workers in a variety of other contexts, 
for example after a care assessment under the Care Act 2014. Schemes like Access to Work 
are invaluable in helping people with a disability take up work opportunities, or help them 
remain in work, although issues of inadequate funding have been blighting the scheme, as in 
other areas of the system. The scheme has also extended to assisting workers who become 
disabled while in a job. Disability Rights UK, Fact Sheet F27 provides very useful information: 
https://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/access-work  Employed recipients of Employment and 
Support Allowance are eligible for support from Access to Work if they are undertaking 
‘Permitted Work’; https://www.gov.uk/access-to-work/eligibility: both sites accessed 21 
January 2019.  
 
4. A ‘core’ definition of low pay is based on gross hourly earnings (excluding overtime) below 
two-thirds of median pay. This puts the ‘low paid’ at 20 per cent of the workforce 
(approximately 5 million people). A ‘needs-based living wage’ definition suggests a figure that 
is closer to 25 per cent - approximately 6.2 million people, up from 6 million in 2016; 
Resolution Foundation, 2017: 5. A growing number of ‘self -employed’ must be added to that 
figure, and this informs a total that is nearer 30 per cent of labour market participants.  
 
5. The Foundation has called for changes to UC that will allow families with children to keep 




families would, they say, boost the budgets of 9.6 million parents and children, half of whom 
are in working poverty (4.9 million). The view is that as a redistributive mechanism the UC 
work allowance is ‘over five times more effective’ than increasing personal tax allowances.  
 
6. The Social Mobility Commission has found in a report on training that cuts in government 
funding have made free-to-access courses hard to come by. As a result, employers are now 
the main providers of training opportunities to improve their skills and ability to progress to  
better work on higher earnings. However, most training is more likely to be offered to those 
in higher-paid or senior roles. Low-skilled, male, manual workers are the least likely to access 
training, the report found. According to the Chair of the Commission, Dame Martina Milburn, 
‘The result is a system with vast numbers of low-skilled workers with little opportunity to build 
skills and escape low pay’ (Social Mobility Commission, 2019).  
 
Chapter 2 – The ‘Welfare’ in Welfare State  
1. As a result of the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 (and in Scotland by the Poor Law 
Amendment (Scotland) Act of 1845).  
 
2. Bateman v Asda Stores PLC [2010] IRLR 370. In order for Asda to move all staff into a uniform 
pay structure the courts allowed it to do this by imposing the change on all staff, including 
those who objected to the changes. For a compelling and wide -ranging critique of the 
judgment and its implications, see F. Reynold QC and J. Hendy QC, ‘Reserving the Right to 
Change Terms and Conditions: How Far can the Employer Go?’ (2012) 41 ILJ 79–92.  
3.     As in Ali v Christian Salvesen Food Services Ltd [1997] ICR 25, CA. Annualised hours agreements 
which pay a standard wage for basic weekly hours, but which make provision for a minimum 
threshold of further hours to be worked before a worker could qualify for additional 
payments, could not be construed as giving a worker a right to pro rata payments if he leaves 
the job before the threshold has been reached. Implied terms can be introduced when this 
can be justified, particularly if this is needed to give effect to the parties’ intentions – but in 
the Ali case this was refused on the basis that the absence of any agreed provision to cater for 
this eventuality may have been intended when the agreement was negotiated.  
4.     After a successful campaign by Unison, the Supreme Court struck down the previous system; 
R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. Evidence from a project led by Prof. Nicole Busby, 
Dr Emily Rose of Strathclyde University, and Prof. Morag McDermont of Bristol University, 
clearly showed how fees inhibited claimants pursuing claims (Busby, Rose, and McDermont 
2018). ET Claims can relate to a wide range of issues which impact on the welfare of workers 
and families including non-payment of wages and benefits like SSP, as well as unfair dismissal 
and equalities issues.  
5.    The leading case is Barry v Gloucestershire County Council [1997] 2 WLR 459, House of Lords, 
approved in R (McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2011] UKSC 33, 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declined to reconsider the Barry decision in R (KM) v 
Cambridgeshire County Council [2012] UKSC 23 – so the position remains unaltered for the 




6.   The commentary quotes a director of a leading private provider, MetLife, pointing out what a 
valuable area this represents for the ‘Group Risk industry’, especially given the current lack of 
coverage and the importance of employee benefits as a means of attracting and retaining 
employees.  
7.    A detailed consideration of the system and particular benefits is outside the scope of this 
paper. Reference may be made to specialist works like the CPAG Benefits and Tax Credits 
Handbook 2018-19; and the Disability Rights Handbook 2018-19 (Edition 43) (Disability Rights, 
2018). Citizens Advice also provide a valuable on-line service ‘Benefit Calculators: What 
Benefits Can You Get’: www.citizensadvice.org.uk/benefits/ last accessed 3rd February 2019. 
8.   The benefit cap outside Greater London in 2018/19 is £384.62 a week (£20,000 a year) for a 
couple; £384.62 1 week (£20,000 a year) for a single parent and children living with the 
claimant in the household; and £257.69 a week (£13,400 a year) for a single adult. Inside Great 
London the cap rises: £442.31 a week (£23,000 a year) for a couple; £442.31 a week (£23,000 
a year) for a single parent with children living with her/him; and £296.35 a week (£15,410 a 
year) for a single adult. For those increasing their hours and transferring to WTC there is no 
cap, even if the WTC award is £0. Otherwise, exemptions are limited, eg for claimants who are 
carers, or on DLA/PIP, Attendance Allowance, or in-work UC with net monthly earnings above 
£542. 
9.   R (DA and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UKSC/0061) on appeal from the 
Court of Appeal [2017] HLR 35; [2018] EWCA Civ 504. The appellants are single parents with 
children under the age of two. As they are not in employment they are subject to a benefits 
cap unless and until they take up employment at the prescribed level of working hours (usually 
16). They argued that imposing a cap on single parents with at least two children under the 
age of two was unlawful as they were in a very different position from others affected by the 
cap: this was as a result of the difficulties and barriers they have faced because of their 
childcare responsibilities. The claim succeeded in the High Court, but the decision was then 
overturned by a majority in the Court of Appeal. In legal terms the issue is whether the cap, 
imposed in 2016 by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, s.8, unlawfully discriminates 
against parents or their children contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights art. 
14, when read with article 8 or Article 2 of the First Protocol, and in breach of the UK’s 
obligations under article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. A further argument 
was that the government’s actions were simply ‘irrational’. The case is being heard a longside 
another case R (DS and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UKSC/0074). In 
that case the focus was on the legality of the cap which, from 11th January 2017, was lowered 
from £500 to £384.62 a week. One parent in the case lost £80 a week and the other £110. 
Both women had been unable to obtain employment ‘despite their best efforts’. The Supreme 
Court will be deciding the legality of the government’s actions in extending the reduced cap 
to such parents. 
10. State Retirement Pension is a benefit that is still largely dependent on NI Contributions. Those 
with gaps in their contributions record receive a correspondingly low State Pension. In the 
absence of any kind of private pension, Pension Credit, as paid under the State Pension Credit 
Act 2002, is the system’s cure-all. Essentially, if the claimant has no income a full ‘guarantee 




       Otherwise, if she or he has any weekly income or other income (notional or real) an award of 
PC is based on the difference between the guarantee amount and that income (s.2(2)(a), (b)). 
The award is helpful in passporting claimants to other benefits, including help with housing 
costs.  
 
Chapter 3 - From Collective Insurance to Means-Testing & Wage Subsidisation  
1.   Under the scheme in Part 2, the worker paid 2 1/2 pence, which was matched by the same 
amount from the employer. The taxpayer’s contribution was 3 pence.  
2.    Public Assistance Committees carried out checks of claimants’ and recipients’ means before 
the full amount of the ‘dole’ was paid. Opposition to the post-1931 measures followed, with 
contemporary accounts highlighting the resistance from the labour movement and unions; 
The Means Test 1931-32: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rN6_CSS4lUI : last accessed 3rd 
February 2019. However, there was little easing of what had become a predominantly means-
tested system, with means-testing procedures at its core.  
3.    Jobseeker’s Act 1995 ss.6, 6A-6K, and JSA Regulations 2013, SI 2013/378 regs 17-30.  
4.     Interestingly, the War Cabinet summary of the report observed that the Social Security 
scheme Beveridge proposed was ‘pre-eminently not a plan for giving to everybody something 
for nothing and without trouble’. Instead, it was a plan to secure to each citizen an income 
adequate to satisfy a natural 'minimum standard’ on ‘condition of service and contribution…’  
It was added that ‘benefits in return for contributions rather than free allowances from the 
State is what the people of Britain desire’. (para D21). It went on: ‘whatever money is required 
for provision of insurance benefits should come from a Fund to which the recipients have 
contributed’ (p.3); War Cabinet Summary of Report Social Insurances and Allied Services by 
Sir William Beveridge: Confidential WP (42) 547, 25
th 
November 1942 (National Archives, 
accessed 12
th 
November 2017). National Assistance as a fall-back source of support remained 
outside the scheme (p.9)  
5.   The best example was the State Earnings-Related Pension (SERPS), but this approach also 
extended to a range of other contributory benefits.  
6.   Beveridge had also put forward a proposal for a benefit for ‘unmarried wives’ and separated 
wives, which was rejected. 
7.  Among other things, the Finer Report recommended the introduction of a new non-
contributory benefit, the Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance as an alternative to SB: a 
recommendation that the government rejected. Beveridge had also put forward a proposal 
for a benefit for ‘unmarried wives’ and separated wives, which was also rejected.  
8.   For example, the National Federation of Claimants Unions Claimant Handbook 1976 (London: 
NFCU, 1976). Although this was to change when it became New Labour policy to promote lone 
parents’ routes into employment, assisted by programmes linked to the New Deal  for Lone 
Parents, and the inclusion of childcare elements in tax credits, the system until then was not 




2000 there was every disincentive to work given the way take-up of employment 
opportunities was, in effect, penalised by keeping lone parent earnings ‘disregards’ low in the 
calculation of means-tested benefits like Income Support.  
9.     Now in ss.6D, 6E of the 1995 Act as ‘work search’ and ‘work availability’ requirements, 
embodied in a wider range of work-related requirements in ss.6-6L and in the JSA Regulations 
1996, SI 1996/207 regs.5-22.  
10.  One significant feature of New Labour’s system, by the time Working Tax Credit was 
introduced by the Tax Credit Act 2002, was that it was extended to couples and single workers 
without children: at that point it ceased to be simply family support, as earlier schemes like 
Family Income Support, Family Credit, and Earnings Top-Up were characterised. By 2002 WTC 
had transitioned into a full-blown general subsidy for all labour market participants including 
the self-employed. The intention was to create a ‘single visible instrument’ to make work pay, 
available to groups without children and ‘underpinned by the National Minimum Wage’ (HM 
Treasury, 2000: para. 1.5).  
11. A JSA claimant hoping to rely on her Class 1 NICs record currently (as at 20
th 
November 2018) 
needs to show that she has  
• Paid Class 1 NICs for one year (the ‘base’ year) of the last two complete years before the 
start of her ‘relevant benefit year’ and satisfies several additional conditions, including the 
key requirement that her relevant earnings for the base year on which primary Class 1 
contributions have been paid (or treated as paid) are not less than the base year's Lower 
Earnings Limit multiplied by 26  
• In respect of those last two complete years either paid Class 1 NICs or been credited with 
earnings (but also satisfies an additional earnings factor condition now required for 
contribution-based claims)  
• Not exceeded a prescribed earnings limit (in effect a means-test introduced into the JSA 
contribution conditions); and  
• No entitlement to Income Support.  
In comparison, the key ‘additional condition’ is simplicity itself! It is that ‘the earnings factor 
derived from so much of the claimant's earnings as did not exceed the upper earnings limit 
and upon which primary Class 1 contributions have been paid or treated as paid or from so 
much of the claimant's earnings as did not exceed the upper earnings limit and credited is not 
less, in each of the two complete years, than the lower earnings limit for the year multiplied 
by 50’. (JS Act 1995 ss.1(2)(d) and 2).  
 
Chapter 4 – Making Work Pay 
 
1.  Schemes of this kind include, since 2016, Ireland’s Employee Tax  Credit and the Earned Income 
Credit. Their main attraction is that they can deliver support across a range of income sources, 
including pension, managed from within the Irish PAYE system and earnings. A group like 
pensioners who are still engaged in part-time work can benefit from support directed at both 




(1000) under the ETC scheme, and Case 1 earned income of €2000 would get a credit at 20% 
of €400 under the Earned Income Tax Credit scheme. EIC support also extends to the self-
employed. Information on the schemes is accessible on the Irish Revenue site: 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/personal-tax-credits-reliefs-and-exemptions/income-and-
employment/earned-income-credit/index.aspx last accessed 2nd February 2019.  
2.  On the USA’s EITC scheme, see ‘Earned Income Tax Credit’, US Inland Revenue Service. The 
scheme is complex and has some significant shortcomings, including earned income and 
adjusted gross income thresholds that can operate inflexibly for claimant groups on variable 
hours and earnings; and documentation requirements, including the need for completed 
Federal tax returns and records can be onerous (Alstott, 1995). On the system’s other 
problems and limitations, see Alstott, Essentially, the scheme must operate within a wi der 
framework in which labour law assists low wages and harsh working conditions, and a social 
law safety-net which leaves gaps through which low-income workers can often fall. Reforms, 
she has argued, are needed to both systems.  
3.   Details were in Proposals for a Tax-Credit System, London: HMSO, Cm 5116 (January 1972). A 
commentary on the proposals was provided by Peter Sloman in 'The Pragmatist's Soluti on to 
Poverty' (Sloman, 2015).  
4.   When the 10p starting rate was introduced most people under 65 paid nothing on their first 
£5,225 (thereby taking the lowest paid in the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution out of 
tax); 10% was paid on the next £2,230; and 22% on the next £32,370. After abolition the 
position of those with income under £5,435 remained unchanged, but 20% was payable on 
income in the next £36,000. This meant that people with incomes between £5,435 and 
£19,355 were worse off. They lost more from the abolition of the starting rate than they got 
from the cut to basic rate, and according to IFS figures the loss was at its worst (£232) for 
anyone earning £7,755. The main gainers were those earning between £19,355 and £40,000 
would gain noticeably from the reform, with the biggest gain of £337 a year at £36,140. On 
the face of it the government was ‘robbing the poor to pay the rich(er)’. However, as the IFS 
analysis pointed out, other changes were made – for example by raising tax allowances for a 
number of groups, including the over-65s, injecting £1 billion into the tax credits system, and 
directing help at those on Working Tax Credit by raising the income threshold at which tax 
credits begins to be withdrawn (something which the current Chancellor, Philip Hammond did 
in Budget 2018 when he committed £1.5 billion into the UC work allowances scheme in the 
face of a powerful barrage of criticism of the way in-work UC is being mismanaged). The 
verdict of the IFS on Gordon Brown’s actions in 2008?  Taking the changes overall, and 
especially the re-working of tax credits support, ‘the poorest third of the population actually 
emerge as the biggest winners…’  
5.   Working Tax Credit Act 2002. Working Tax Credit still extends to a sizeable part of the working 
population as a ‘legacy’ benefit except in those areas where Universal Credit as an in -work 
benefit has replaced it and will eventually replace it completely.  
6.  Payments used to be assessed and paid by employers through the payroll in accordance with 
Inland Revenue guidance, with payments being made with wages (and showing on pay slips) 




reinforcing the message that ‘work pays’. The intention behind this was to mirror contractual 
wages, and to minimise any stigma associated with in-work benefits support, and to 
emphasise the advantages of a wage over ‘welfare’ (Treasury, March 2000, para. 2.8). Later, 
payments were made by HMRC directly to recipients under the Tax Credits Act 2002. WTC and 
Child Tax Credit paid with it are now ‘legacy’ benefits being progressi vely replaced by 
Universal Credit (paid directly by the DWP under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, Part 1).  
7.   HC Deb, Vol 629, 15 October 2017, cols 860 et seq. The Trussell Trust reported a rise in take-
up of food bank help by UC recipients; Early Warnings: Universal Credit and Foodbanks, 
Trussell Trust April 2017.  
8.  BBC Panorama 17th November 2018: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0bs39ky last 
accessed 3rd January 2019. 
9.   House of Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions Inquiry: Report of the In-Work 
Progression in Universal Credit Inquiry, HC 549, 11 March 2016.  
10. Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection Guidance ‘Working Family Payment 
(WFP) – SW22’, November 2018: https://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Working-Family-
Payment-SW-22.aspx  last accessed 10th December 2018.  
11. A restriction made by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016, s.13. Given that the impact 
assessment said that the change will affect over half a million families, and save the Treasury 
a lot of money, it is more likely that the measure was really an austerity one.  
 
Chapter 5 – Raising the Floor?  
1.  These include the role of work for individuals and society, the need to end women’s pervasive 
global inequality in the world of work, and the importance of managing inequalities i n sectors 
like the platform economy and cushioning the impacts of life transformations (and typically 
as a result of family life changes, and new technology impacts).  
2.  Among other things, the survey concluded that some countries are reluctant to introduce 
minimum wage systems because they already have suitable alternative ways of regulating 
pay, for example collective bargaining and agreements providing adequate protection at 
sectoral level. They may not see the value of such wage-setting: in fact this has been a reason 
for some countries not ratifying Convention 131.  
3.   The DGB made it clear at the time, however, for example when commenting on an OECD 
analysis of minimum wage-setting in 2015 (‘Minimum Wages Help the Low-Paid with Little 
Adverse Effect on Employment Levels’) that a national minimum wage should not be regarded 
as a ‘panacea’ for curbing imbalances in the labour market; and it called for wider measures 
including tailored support for the unemployed and low-paid, the containment of temporary 
work and service contracts, and protective measures in collective agreements (Stefan Körzell, 




4. The Statute of Labourers 1351 followed the Ordinance, and among other things it attempted to 
stop wages being paid at pre-plague rates and expected everyone under the age of 60 to take 
up employment.  
5.  This was weighted in favour of the bottom of health service pay scales; see the details of the 
settlement in the NHS Agenda for Change Pay Scales 2018–19.  
6.  Living wage clauses and other the social objectives have featured in the public procurement 
legal framework but have been subject to restrictions in their scope (Koukiadaki, 2014).  
7. The NMW scheme operates within the legal framework provided by the National Minimum 
Wage Act 1998 and National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999, SI 1999/584.  
8.  See the submissions to the Low Pay Commission, Annex A, HM Treasury, 2002 (Simpson, 2004: 
24). The floor ensures that at least part of the burden of low pay is allocated to employers 
(Davies and Freedland, 2007: 189). As previously suggested, tax credits have the advantage of 
delivering support that is more targeted on a recipient’s particular needs and family 
circumstances.  
9.   S.1(3) of the 1998 Act enables the Secretary of State to prescribe a single hourly rate. The 
National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015, SI 2015/621 consolidated the original 1999 
regulations and set out how the NLW is to work. In particular, reg 4 prescribed the NLW single 
hourly rate. Reg. 4A sets lower rates for those who are 21 or over but not yet 25 (£7.38), and 
even lower rates for those who are younger or on the apprenticeship rate (£3.75).  
10. National Minimum Wage’: www.USDAW.org.uk/Campaigns/National-Minimum-Wage last 
accessed 3
rd 
December 2018. Usdaw believes that the NLW should start to be paid at 18 not 
25. ‘We do not believe a lower rate for workers under 25 is justified, when they are doing the 
same job’. It also supports adoption of the Real Living Wage rather than the NLW, pointing 
out that the RLW is worth £10.20 an hour in London and £8.75 in the rest of the country, and 
is ‘independently calculated, and is based on the amount needed for a decent standard of 
living’.  
11. Care workers who are required under their contracts to sleep at or near their workplace may 
only be ‘available for work’ rather than actually working for NMW purposes as a result of the 
complex ways in which ‘time work’ and ‘salaried hours work’ are dealt with under the original 
1999 and later 2015 regulations. Workers expected just to be ‘available’ do not necessarily 
qualify to be paid the NMW for the whole of a sleep-in shift: only for the periods they should 
be awake for work purposes; Royal Mencap Society v Tomlinson-Blake [2018] IRLR 932, Court 
of Appeal.  
12. As in Twenty-Four Seven Recruitment Services v Alfonso [2018] 10 WLUK 269. In that case 
agency workers' terms and conditions simply said that they would be paid a rate that was 
‘equivalent to the NMW’. The Employment Appeal tribunal accepted that this was compliant 
with the Agency Workers Regulations 2010, even though it gave them little in terms of detail. 
However, as is common practice now, it said that simply telling the staff that they could be 




enough as it did not give them a figure for the expected hours of work during any assignment 
as required by reg. 10(1)(a)(iii).  
13. 2018 No.433 (W.76).  
14. 2018 No.65 (20
th 
March 2018).  
15. Under the Scottish order, for example, the basic minimum rate aligns with the NLW, ie £7.83 
for all workers, as the base-line. However, in addition to higher rates further up the scale there 
is a secure minimum overtime rate which is £11.75. Criteria and information on payment 
requirements is in the Scottish Agricultural Wages Order Guidance:  
      https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-agricultural-wages-order-guidance/pages/3/ last 
accessed 4th February 2019. 
 
Chapter 6 – Universal Credit  
1. Unite has called for the system to be stopped; ‘Stop Universal Credit’: 
https://unitetheunion.org/campaigns/stop-universal-credit/ last accessed 12
th 
December 
2018. It has organised successful national days of action to build support for the campaign. 
Liane Groves, Unite’s Head of Community has described UC as creating a ‘host ile environment 
for claimants’ and as unfit for purpose’. Other unions like the NUJ have attacked the impact 
of UC on groups like disabled members. The Chair of the National Union of Journalists Disabled 
Members Council, Ann Galpin, said that it had been clear that UC’s roll-out had been 
‘shambolic’: she added that ‘Combined with cuts to Access to Work, di fficulties accessing 
Personal Independence Payments, and the reduction of severe/enhanced disability 
premiums, UC is making it harder than ever for disabled people to stay in work’; NUJ 
Statement on the National Audit Office’s Critical Report on Universal Credit (15 
2. The introduction of Universal Credit is causing unacceptable hardship and difficulties for many 
of the claimants it was designed to help. However, while the Department is responsive to 
feedback on its digital systems from staff, it has persistently dismissed evidence that Universal 
Credit is causing hardship for claimants and additional burdens for local organisations and 
refuses to measure what it does not want to see. In 2013 this Committee raised concerns 
about the Department’s culture of reporting good news and denying problems that emerge. 
In further reports in 2015 and 2016 the Committee warned about the Department’s continued 
lack of transparency. It is hugely regrettable that the Department has not heeded these 
warnings. Instead of listening to organisations on the frontline supporting claimants, the 
Department has continued with its fortress mentality and as a result is failing claimants who 
struggle to adapt to the way Universal Credit works’ (Committee Summary).  
 
3.   He also made the connection between the failures in government’s welfare policies and the 
rise in child poverty, referring to the fact that two-thirds of children in poverty have a parent 
in work, but the parents were earning too little to lift them out of poverty. He added that the 




4.   Unite and other unions, with the help of the TUC, organised a highly successful day of action 
against UC on 24
th 
May 2018. Liane Groves, Head of Unite Community, when calling for UC to 
be stopped commented that “Despite knowing that Universal Credit causes serious problems 
for those claiming it the government is ploughing ahead regardless while claimants are 
descending further into debt, relying on food banks and getting into rent arrears and in many 
cases are being evicted from their homes.  
5.  Among the findings in the Welfare Conditionality Project 2013-2018: Final Findings Report it 
was concluded that Welfare conditionality within the social security system is largely 
ineffective in facilitating people’s entry into or progression within the paid labour market over 
time. Benefit sanctions do little to enhance people’s motivation to prepare for, seek, or enter 
paid work. Within conditional welfare interventions the provision of appropriate and 
meaningful support, rather than sanction, is pivotal in triggering and sustaining both paid 
employment and positive change (WelCond Project, 2018).  
6.  The Trussell Trust has been tracking take-up of food bank support and reporting rises in take-
up of food bank help by UC recipients.  
7.  ‘Para. 1 Core Objectives: (a) ‘A key aspect of the Universal Credit is that it should mimi c work 
and receipt of a salary. In order to help households understand what money they receive and 
how choices over work affect it, the Universal Credit will be simpler … Universal Credit will be 
paid monthly, reflecting the fact that 75% of people are paid earnings monthly in arrears’. 
(BACS Family Finance Survey 2011).  
8. The restriction was made by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 and the Loans for Mortgage 
Interest Regulations 2017, SI 2017/725. It affected an estimated 124,000 claimants who 
received Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI) 45% being of whom were of Pension Credit age. 
The average weekly amount of SMI for pensioners was about £20, while for those of working 
age it was about £40 (equating to mortgage amounts of about £40,000 for pensioners and 
£80,000 for those of working age) (Morgan, 2018).  
9. Workers on very low earnings may get maximum Housing Benefit with benefits like income-
based JSA. Otherwise, they will get HB with their WTC – or housing costs will be paid with their 
UC. A rise in earnings will generally mean less support for rental costs given the way ‘earnings’, 
including arrears of wages, are dealt with under the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, SI 
2006/213. Settlements of equal pay claims, with payments made in lump sums, are  generally 
treated as arrears of income. This triggers a ‘recoverable overpayment’; Minter v Kingston-
upon-Hull City Council [2012] HLR 3, CA.  
10. On the amounts HB can deliver by way of eligible costs, rent, and ‘maximum rent’, see the 
Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, SI 2006/213, particularly Part 8 (regs. 11-18A). Besides 
schemes like the bedroom tax, other restrictions have been tried and failed in the past - for 
example when a ‘single room’ limit was imposed on the under-25s as a group.  
11. R (DA and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (UKSC/0061) on appeal from the 






Adams, Z. and Deakin, S. (2014) Re-regulating Zero Hours Contracts, Liverpool: Institute of 
Employment Rights  
Adireksombat, K. and Jinjarak, Y. (2008) ‘‘The Adoption of In-Work Benefit Programs: An Exploration 
of International Experiences’, Singapore: Nanyang Technical University, 2008.  
Alston, P. (2018) ‘Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights’ (UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner), 16th November 2018: 
https://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?LangID=E&NewsID=23881 last accessed 
21st January 2019. 
Alstott, A. (1995) ‘The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 
108 Harvard Law Review 533.  
Alstott, A. (2010) ‘Why the Earned Income Tax Credit Doesn’t Make Work Pay’, 73 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 285-314 (Winter 2010).  
Bachelet Report (2015) Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalisation , Geneva: 
International Labour Organisation.  
Bain, G. (2013) ‘Minimum wage risks becoming going rate for millions, low pay pioneer warns’, The 
Guardian, 5th July 2013.  
Bain Commission (2014) More than a Minimum: The Resolution Foundation Review of the Future of 
the National Minimum Wage Final Report (London: Resolution Foundation).  
Barr, N. (2001) The Welfare State as Piggy Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Barr, N. (2012) The Economics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Bayliss, F. J. (1962) British Wages Councils, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.  
BBC Films (2016) I Daniel Blake (BBC Films/BFI, Director: Ken Loach, 2016).  
BBC/Will Self (2018) ‘Jobless in Wolverhampton,  BBC Radio 4, 2nd February 2018 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b09q3sp5  last accessed 1 November 2018.  
BBC (2018) Money Box, BBC Radio 4,17
th 
November 2018.  
Bell, T. (2018) ’To Maintain Our Welfare State We Need to Rethink How We Pay for It', London: 
Resolution Foundation. 
 
Bell K. and Gaffney D. (2012) Making a Contribution: Social Security for the Future, London: TUC.  
Bercusson, B. (1982) ‘Proposal to Rescind the Fair Wages Resolution: The  Future of Fair Wages Policy’ 
(1982) 11(1) Industrial Law Journal 271.  
Beveridge, W. (1942) Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge, Cm 6404.  




Bonnet, F., Saget, C., Weber, A. (2012) Social Protection and Minimum Wages Responses to the 2008 
Financial and Economic Crisis: Findings from the ILO/World Bank Inventory (Geneva: ILO, Social 
Security Department/Conditions of Work and Employment Branch, 2012),  Employment Working 
Paper No. 113.  
Briggs, A. (1961) The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, European Journal of Sociology (1961) Vol 
2 Issue 2, 221.  
Broughton, N. and Richards, B. (2016) Tough Gig: Tackling Low Paid Self-Employment in London and 
the UK (London: Social Market Foundation, 2016). 
Brown, G. (2018) ‘Universal Credit is cruel far beyond austerity – and it’s becoming Theresa May’s Poll 
Tax, says Gordon Brown’, Daily Mirror 9
th 
October 2018.  
Browne, J. and Paull, G. (2010) Parent's Work: Entry, Progression, Retention and Child Poverty, DWP 
Research Report No. 626.  
Budget 2015 (2015) Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget 2015 HM Treasury, 8th July 
2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-george-osbornes-summer-budget-
2015-speech last accessed 14th January 2019. 
Budget 2018 (2018) Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget 2018 HM Treasury, 29th 
October 2018: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/budget-2018-philip-hammonds-speech  
last accessed 7th January 2019 






Children’s Society (2017) The Parent Trap: Childcare Cuts under Universal Credit (London: Children’s 
Society, 2017).  
Chote/IFS (2008) ‘Abolition of the 10P Starting Rate’, London: Institute of Fiscal Studies, April 2008 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4195 Last accessed 10th October 2018.  
CIPD (2014) Making Work Pay – Implementing Universal Credit, London: CIPD, 2014.  
Clarke, K (1994) ‘Building Bridges Out of Dependence’, Lecture to the Social Market Foundation, 
London School of Economics,12th July 1994. 
Clements, L. et al (2017) Community Care and the Law, London: Legal Action Group.  
Commons Opposition Day Motion (2017) ‘Pause of Universal Credit Full Service Roll-Out’, HC Deb, Vol 
629, 15 Oct 2017, Cols 860 et seq. 
Conservative Manifesto (2017) 'Forward Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous 
Future', London: Conservative Party. 
Corlett, A et al/Resolution Foundation (2018) ‘The Living Standards Audit’, London: Resolution 
Foundation. 
Cory, G. and Stirling, A. (2016) 'Pay and Parenthood - An Analysis of Wage Inequality between Mums 




Costa Dias, M. and W. Elming, Joyce, R. (2016) The Gender Wage Gap, London: Institute for Fiscal 
Studies.  
Cousins, M. (2014) ‘In-Work Benefits: Effective Social Protection or “Emperor’s New Clothes?”’  16 
European Journal of Social Security 100–21. 
 
CPAG (2009) Ending Child Poverty: A Manifesto for Success, London: CPAG. 
 
CPAG (2018a) Welfare Benefits and Tax Credits Handbook 2018-19, London: Child Poverty Action 
Group.  
 




D’Arcy, C. and Whittaker, M. (2016) The First 100 Days: Early Evidence of the Impact of the National 
Living Wage, London: Resolution Foundation.  
 
Daniel Blake (2016) I Daniel Blake, Author: Paul Laverty. Film: BBC Films/BFI, Director Ken Loach: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfilms/film/i_daniel_blake   
 
Davies, P. and Freedland, M. (1993) Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993).  
 
Davies, P. and Freedland, M. (2007), Towards a Flexible Labour Market: Labour Legislation and 
Regulation since the 1990s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 189. 
 
Deakin, S. and Morris, G. (2012) Labour Law Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
 
Deakin, S. and Wilkinson, F. (1996) Labour Standards: Essential to Economic and Social Progress, 
London: Institute of Employment Rights.  
 
Deakin, S. and Wilkinson, F. (2005) The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and 
Legal Evolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
De Stefano, V. (2016) ‘The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time Workforce’: On-Demand Work, Crowd-work, and 
Labor Protection in the ‘Gig Economy’, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal Vol 37(3) (Spring) 
471.  
Deakin, S. and Wilkinson, F. (2005) The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and 
Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Department for Business (2015) Fixing the Foundations: Creating a More Prosperous Nation , London: 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and HM Treasury, Cm 9098.  
Department of Employment (1988) Wages Councils - Consultation, London: Department of 
Employment, 1988.  
Dickens, R., Gregg, P., Machin, S., Manning, A ‘Wages Councils: Was there a Case for Abolition?’ (1993) 




Disability Rights (2018) Disability Rights Handbook (Edition 43), London: Disability Rights UK. 
DSS (1998a) New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare, London: Department of 
Social Security, Department of Social Security Cm 3805. 
DSS (1998a) New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare, London: Department of 
Social Security, Department of Social Security Cm 3805.  
DWP (2010a) 21st Century Welfare (Cm 7913).  
DWP (2010b) Universal Credit: Welfare that Works (Cm 7957).  
DWP (2011) The Payment Proposal, UC Policy Briefing (No.2).  
DWP (2017) Universal Credit – Leaving Paid Work or Losing Pay Voluntarily (LV) or through Misconduct, 
DWP Memorandum ADM 17/17.  
DWP (2018) Universal Support 2018/19 Guidance, London: Department of Work and Pensions, March 
2018.  
Elliot, L. (2018) ‘More Jobs at Risk of Automation if Minimum Wage Rises, IFS Warns’, The Guardian 
4
th 
January 2018.  
Ewing, K., Hendy, J., Jones, C. (eds)/IER (2016) A Manifesto for Labour Law: Towards a Comprehensive 
Revision of Workers’ Rights, Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights.  
Ewing, K. and Hendy, J. (2017) ‘New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade Union Recognition 
and Collective Bargaining’ Industrial Law Journal, 46(1): 23.  
Ewing, K., Hendy, Jones, C. (eds)/IER (2018) Rolling Out the Manifesto for Labour Law, Liverpool: 
Institute of Employment Rights.  
Ewing, Kate (2018) ‘Pay Transparency in Homecare’, Employment Law Bulletin 2018, 6.  




Ferragina, E. and A. Arrigoni, A. (2016) ‘From the Third Way to the Big Society: The Rise and Fall of 
Social Capital’, British Politics and Policy, London School of Economics.  
Finch, D. (2016) Universal Challenge: Making a Success of Universal Credit (London: Resolution 
Foundation, 2016) 5.  
Finch, D./Resolution Foundation (2018) Just About Managing Families Set for Biggest Year of Benefits 
Cuts (London: Resolution Foundation, 2018).  
Finch, D. and Whittaker, M. (2016) Under New Management: Options for Supporting ‘Just Managing’ 
Families at the Autumn Statement, London: Resolution Foundation, 2016).  
Finer Report (1974) Report of the Committee on One- Parent Families (Chair: M. Finer), July 1974, Cm 
5629.  
Gardiner, L. and Corlett, A. (2015) Looking through the Hour Glass – Hollowing Out of the UK Jobs 
Market Pre- and Post-Crisis (London: Resolution Foundation, 2015)  
Greenwood, W. (1933) Love on the Dole, London: Jonathan Cape.  
Hayes, L. (2017) 8 Good Reasons Why Adult Social Care Needs Sectoral Collective Bargaining , Liverpool: 




Hirsch, D. (2017) ‘Not by Pay Alone’ 156 CPAG Poverty 12.  
Hirsch, D. (2018) The Cost of a Child in 2018 (7
th 
Report in Annual Series), Centre for Research in Social 
Policy, Loughborough University, Published by the Child Poverty Action Group.  
HM Treasury (1998) The Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and Benefit System, London: HM Treasury.  
HM Treasury (2000) Tackling Poverty and Making Work Pay – Tax Credits for the 21
st 
Century, March 
2000 (No. 6 in the series The Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and Benefit System).  
HMRC/ONS (2010) Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics, HMRC/Office of National Statistics, April 
2010.  
HM Treasury (2002) Evidence to the Low Pay Commission, Annex A Submission, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office.  
Hollen Lees, L (1997) The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People 1700-1948,  
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
IFS (1999) Family Credit and the Working Families Tax Credit in the United Kingdom , Institute of Fiscal 
Studies, 1999.  
IFS/Johnson, P. (2015) ‘The Vast and Growing Housing Benefits Bill’, BBC Radio 4 Analysis, 30 
September 2015: https://www.ifs.org.uk/about/blog/309   
IFS (2016) IFS Green Budget 2016, London: Institute of Fiscal Studies.  
ILO (1952) Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952, International Labour Organisation 
No. 102.  
ILO (2014) General Survey on Minimum Wage Systems 2014, International Labour Organisation No. 
102.  
ILO (2018) The Global Commission on the Future of Work Geneva: International Labour Organisation.  
IPPR (2016) Boosting Britain’s Low-Wage Sectors: A Strategy for Productivity, Innovation and Growth, 
London: Institute of Public Policy Research).  
Jitendra, A./CPAG (2018) ‘You Can’t Live on Thin Air: The Wait for Universal Support’, Poverty 160, 6-
10.  
Johnson, P. (2018) ‘Switching millions to universal credit poses real threat of ‘poll tax’ moment’, 
London: Institute for Fiscal Studies’, 15
th 
October 2018  
Joyce, R. (2018) ‘Poverty and Low Pay in the UK: The State of Play and the Challenges Ahead’, Institute 
of Fiscal Studies, 6
th 
March 2018.  
JRF/MacInnes et al (2015) Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion, York: J. Rowntree Foundation.  
JRF/Thompson, S. (2015) The Low-Pay, No-Pay Cycle, York: J Rowntree Foundation.  
JRF/Tinson et al (2016) Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2016, York: J Rowntree Foundation.  






JRF (2018a) ‘Budget 2018: Tackling the Rising Tide of In-Work Poverty’, York: J. Rowntree Foundation, 
12 October 2018 https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/budget-2018-tackling-rising-tide-work-poverty, last 
accessed 15 November 2018.  
Judge, L. (2015) Round the Clock – In-Work Poverty and the ‘Hours’ Question (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group, 2015). 
Keevash, S. (1985) 'The Wages Councils: An Examination of Trade Union and Conservative Government 
Misconceptions about the Effect of Statutory Wage Fixing', 14 Industrial Law Journal 217. 
Körzell, S. (2015) DGB European Employment Outlook, July 2015.  
Koukiadaki, J. (2014). ‘The Far-Reaching Implications of the Laval Quartet: The Case of the UK Living 
Wage’ 43(2) Industrial Law Journal 91.  
Kronman, A. (1980) ‘Contract Law and Distributive Justice’, 89 Yale Law Journal 472. 
Lee, R. (1988) 'Reflections on Primitive Communism' in Ingold, T, Riches, D, Woodburn, J, (eds) Hunters 
and Gatherers (Vol.1, History, Evolution and Social Change), New York: St. Martins Press.  




LGA (2019a) ‘£8 billion funding black hole will swallow up popular council services’, Local Government 
Association, 1st February 2019. 
LGA, 2019b) ‘LGA responds to Education Committee report on early years’, Local Government 
Association, 7th February 2019. 
Labour Party (1997) Getting Welfare to Work: A New Vision for Social Security, London: Labour Party.  
Long, T. (2013) ‘Time Limiting ESA: The Reality’, 24th March 2013: 
https://diaryofabenefitscrounger.blogspot.com/2013/03/time-limiting-esa-reality.html :  
last accessed 10th December 2013  
Lourie, J. (1995) ‘A Minimum Wage’, House of Commons Research Paper 95/7, 17
th 
January 1995.  
Lynn Hollen Lees, The Solidarity of Strangers: The English Poor Laws & the People 1748-1950, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
Lyonette, C. (2015) ‘Part-Time Work, Work–Life Balance and Gender Equality’, Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law Vol 37(3): 321-323  
Machin, R. (2017) ‘The Two-Child Limit for Universal Credit and Child Tax Credit’, The Adviser, Citizens 
Advice Bureau, March 2017, 7-12.  
Machin, R., Norris, D., Jones, M. (2018) ‘Welfare Reform Summit’, Poverty, Journal of the Child Poverty 
Action Group, 2018 Issue 161, 10.  
Mai, V. (2008) The Capacity of Welfare Regimes to Absorb Macro-Economic Shocks: National 
Differences in the Development of Unemployment, Poverty and the Distribution of Income in the 
Aftermath of the Financial Crisis 2008, Hamburg: Anchor 11-15.  
Martínez Lucio, M., Koukiadaki, A., Tavora, I. (2017) The Legacy of Thatcherism in European Labour 
Relations: The Impact of the Politics of Neo-Liberalism and Austerity on Collective Bargaining in a 
Fragmenting Europe, Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights.  
McDonnell (2018) ‘John McDonnell Vows £10 Real Living Wage’, BBC News 26
th 




Mitchinson, R. (2000) The Old Poor Law in Scotland: The Experience of Poverty 1574-1845, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000. 
 
Morgan, G. (2018) Support for Mortgage Interest – Loan Alone The Adviser, February 2018: 
https://medium.com/adviser/support-for-mortgage-interest-a-loan-alone-ff3e5c1e1a10   
 
Nozick, J. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books 
NFCU (1976) National Federation of Claimants Unions Handbook, London: NFCU.  
 
OBR (2018a) OBR Guide to Welfare Spending, London: Office for Budget Responsibility, 2018.  
 
OBR (2018b) Welfare Trends Report 2018 (London: Office of Budget Responsibility, 2018, Cm 9562) 
13.  
OECD (2015) Minimum Wages after the Crisis – Making Them Pay, Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, May 2015.  
O’Grady, F. (2012) in The State of Welfare, BBC Radio 4, 27
th 
November 2012.  
O’Grady, F. (2013) ‘Bring Back Wages Councils to Tackle Living Standards Crisis’, Trade Union Congress, 
8
th 
March 2013.  
 
ONS (2016) How is the Welfare Budget Spent? Office for National Statistics, March 2016.  
 
PAC (2018) Universal Credit Public Accounts Committee 64
th 
Report, HC 1183, 26
th 
October 2018.  
 
Padley, M. and Hirsch, D. (2017) A Minimum Income Standard for the UK in 2017 (York: J Rowntree 
Foundation, 2017) 15.  
Pahl, J. (1990) ‘Household Spending, Personal Spending and the Control of Money in Marriage’, 
Sociology Vol 24(1) February 1990, 119-138.  
Painter, A. and Thoung, C. (2015) Creative Citizen, Creative State: The Principled and Pragmatic Case 
for a Universal Basic Income, London: Royal Society of Arts.  
Papadatou, A. (2018) ‘Gig workers and self-employed need employee benefits’, HR Review 8
th 
November 2018.  
Peedell, C. (2011) ‘Further Privatisation is Inevitable under the Health and Social Care Bill’, British 
Medical Journal 2011, 342.  
Plunkett, J. and Hurrell, A. (2013) Fifteen Years Later: A Discussion Paper on the Future of the UK 









Pollert, A. (2005) ‘The Unorganised Worker: The Decline in Collectivism and New Hurdles to Individual 
Rights’ (2005) 34(3) Industrial Law Journal 217.  
 
Portes, J. and Reed, H. (2018) The Cumulative Impact of Tax and Welfare Reforms (London: Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, 2018).  
 
Puttick, K. (1999) '2020: A Welfare Odyssey - A Commentary on Principles into Practice and the Reform 
Programme', Industrial Law Journal, 28(2) 190-196. 
 
Puttick, K. (2003) Child Support: Parents, the CSA & the Courts, EMIS Professional Publishing.  
Puttick, K. (2012a) ‘21
st 
Century Welfare and the Wage-Work-Welfare Bargain’, Industrial Law Journal, 
41(1) 122.  
Puttick, K. (2012b) ‘21
st 
Century Welfare: Reconstructing the Wage-Work-Welfare Bargain’, Industrial 
Law Journal, 41(2) 236.  
 
Puttick, K. (2015) ‘EEA Workers' Free Movement and Social Rights after Dano  and St Prix: Is a Pandora's 
Box of New Economic Integration and ‘Contribution’ Requirements Opening?' Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law, 37(2), 253-273: http://eprints.staffs.ac.uk/2087/  
 
Puttick, K. (2017) ‘Fragmentation or Disintegration? The Impact of Devolution, Brexit, and the Scottish 
Independence Movement on UK and EU Citizens’ Social Rights’.  
 
Puttick, K. (2018) ‘From Mini to Maxi Jobs? Low Pay, ‘Progression’, and the Duty to Work (Harder)’ 
Industrial Law Journal: https://academic.oup.com/ilj/advance-article-
abstract/doi/10.1093/indlaw/dwy006/5048223?redirectedFrom=fulltext   
 
Resolution Foundation (2014a) Universal Credit: A Policy under Review, London: Resolution 
Foundation.  
 
Resolution Foundation (2014b) More than a Minimum: The Resolution Foundation Review of the 
Future of the National Minimum Wage Final Report, London: Resolution Foundation.  
 
Resolution Foundation (2016) Low Pay Britain 2016, London: Resolution Foundation.  
 
Resolution Foundation (2017) Low Pay Britain 2017, London: Resolution Foundation.  
 
Simpson, B. (2004) ‘The National Minimum Wage Five Years On: Reflections on Some General Issues’ 
33 Industrial Law Journal 22.  




Scottish Government (2016) A New Future for Social Security in Scotland, Scottish Government, March 
2016.  
Simpson, B. (2004) ‘The National Minimum Wage Five Years On: Reflections on Some General Issues’ 
(2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal 22, 24.  
Sloman, P. (2015) ‘The Pragmatist’s Solution to Poverty’: The Heath Government’s Tax Credit Scheme 
and the Politics of Social Policy in the 1970s’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 27(2), December 
2015. 
Social Market Foundation (2016), Tough Gig: Tackling Low Paid Self-Employment in London and the 
UK, London: Social Market Foundation.  
SSAC (2017) In-Work Progression and Universal Credit – A Study by the Social Security Advisory 
Committee (Occasional Paper No.19), November 2017.  
Stiglitz, J. (2009) ‘The Global Crisis, Social Protection and Jobs’, in International Labour Review, Vol. 
148 No. 1–2, pp. 1-13.  
Stiglitz, J. (2010) Freefall, London: Penguin Books.  
Thompson, S. et al, Boosting Britain’s Low-Wage Sectors: A Strategy for Productivity, Innovation and 
Growth (London: Institute of Public Policy Research, 2016.  
Timmins, N. (2001) The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, London: Harper Collins, 2
nd 
ed.  
Townsend, P. (1979) Poverty in the UK, London: Penguin.  
Trussell Trust (2018) ‘More People than Ever Expected through Foodbank Doors this Christmas as 
Charity Releases New Figures’, London: Trussell Trust, November 2018.  
 
TUC (2007a) Hard Work, Hidden Lives Report of the Commission on Vulnerable Work, London: Trade 
Union Congress, 2007, 15th November 2007: http://www.vulnerableworkers.org.uk/cove-report/full-
report/index.htm last accessed 15
th 
January 2019.  
TUC (2007b) ‘A Minimum Social Wage: The TUC Poverty Conference 2007’: 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/minimum-social-wage  last accessed 12th January 
2019. 
TUC (2017b) The Gig is Up: Trade Unions Tackling Insecure Work, London: Trade Union Congress, June 
2017.  
Unite (2018) ‘Universal Credit is causing a hostile environment for thousands of families’, Unite  the 
Union, 23
rd 
May 2018.  
USDAW (2018) The National Living Wage, Union of Shop Distributive & Allied Workers, Manchester: 
2018.  
Wanrooy/WERS (2013) The Workplace Employment Relations Study: First Findings , London: 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, May 2013 (follow-up study Workplaces in the Shadow 




WelCond Project (2018) Welfare Conditionality Project 2013-2018: Final Findings Report: 
http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk  
Wikeley, Ogus and Barendt (2002) The Law of Social Security, 5th edn, London: Butterworths 
LexisNexis. 
Work and Pensions Committee (2016) House of Commons Select Committee on Work and Pensions 
Report of the In-Work Progression in Universal Credit Inquiry, HC 549, 11 March 2016.   
